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INTRODUCTION
This directory has been assembled from those 
frameworks that have been developed in recent years to 
assess aspects of extremist violence, a broad term used 
here to encompass terrorist violence that is framed 
by ideology and targeted violence that is framed by 
idiosyncratic beliefs. A further framework concerned 
with group based violence is included because of its 
potential relevance to group actor terrorist offending. 
For each of these the originators completed their 
own entry and consented to its publication, providing 
contact details for further enquiry.
Each of these frameworks was developed in a slightly 
different context, and optimised for a different purpose 
and group of users; the first three to assess those 
already convicted of terrorist offences or group based 
violence that are direct assessments that incorporate 
to some extent the offender’s own account of their 
offending, and the others to assess the risk of a possible 
first terrorist attack or act of targeted violence against 
a named individual or group that operate as indirect 
assessments carried out without the direct input of the 
subject of concern. These all conform, to a greater or 
lesser extent, to an approach that structures professional 
judgment from a number of potential indicators of risk 
derived from clinical and correctional research and 
practice, with the exception of the IVP that consists of 
a checklist for the assessment of escalating behaviours 
that open source research suggests correspond with 
more serious intent and/or imminence of attack. The 
ERG22+ and the TRAP-18 both provide some risk 
indicators that are more theorised in that they are 
concerned to explain the individual needs that are 
met by engagement in ideology or in an idiosyncratic 
belief system, thereby providing clinical information to 
guide intervention to reduce or manage that risk.The 
VERA (forerunner of the VERA-2R) and the SRG 
(forerunner of the ERG22+) were developed initially 
to assess the risk of re-offending in those already 
convicted of terrorist offences. The original VERA 
derived its risk factors from the terrorist literature, 
evidenced from open source case studies and feedback 
obtained from terrorism experts, national security 
1 Meloy, J.R., Roshdi, K., Glaz-Ocik, J. & Hoffmann, J. (2015). Investigating the individual terrorist in Europe. Journal of Threat Assess 
Management 2: 140-152.
2 Meloy, J. R. (2011). Violent true believers. FBI law enforcement bulletin, 80, 24–32. 
3 Egan, V., Cole, J., Cole, B., Alison, L., Alison, E., Waring, S. & Elntib, S. (2016) Can you identify violent extremists using a screening 
checklist and open-source intelligence alone? Journal of Threat Assessment and Management, 3 (1):26
and law enforcement analysts. The ERG also derived 
its risk factors from the literature, validated against 
the accounts of terrorist offenders themselves and of 
the probation officers working with them. The MLG 
was designed to assess an individual’s risk for group-
based violence, including terrorism, and derives its 
risk factors from the literature on group violence 
and from feedback obtained from experienced threat 
assessment analysts. It is therefore confined to use 
with group actors and the authors recommend that it 
is deployed alongside other tools for the assessment of 
terrorist offending. At the opposite pole, the TRAP-18 
was developed specifically with lone actors in mind, 
though it has been found to have utility also with group 
actors.1 All the other frameworks were developed for 
use with both group and lone actors.
Of those designed specifically to assess the risk of a 
first offence, the TRAP-18 was derived from research 
into lone actor targeted violence in the USA that 
included assassinations, stalking, school shootings, 
work place violence and other idiosyncratic single 
issues, including lone actor terrorist violence.2 It 
includes a set of proximal factors that are intended 
to act as warning factors, and a set of more theorised 
distal factors designed to capture the perpetrator’s 
underlying motivational influences. The IR-46 was 
developed to identify individuals in the community 
at risk of carrying out an Islamist terrorist attack and 
does not purport to be suitable for other ideological 
groups. The IVP was developed in the UK to assist 
in the identification of those in the community 
about whom there may be radicalisation concerns 
and although it claims to be ‘ideologically neutral’3 
six of its 16 indicators apply specifically to Islamist 
extremism. It is derived from the terrorist literature and 
analysis of open source ‘empirical events’, and the IR-
46 was developed by psychologists in the Netherlands 
working with the Dutch National Police and was 
derived from the terrorist literature, closed source 
Islamist case studies and consultation with intelligence 
analysts. Both have a set of ‘red flag’ indicators that 
are associated with advanced terrorist plotting that are 
intended to trigger action by law enforcement.
6 
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Broadly speaking these six frameworks vary to the extent 
that they focus on engagement in ideology, indicators of 
violent intent, and/or terrorist capability, which in turn 
depends on the stage in the terrorist trajectory for which 
they were developed. Those concerned with preventing 
radicalisation focus more on the process of engagement 
and the individual pathway vulnerabilities associated 
with this. Those concerned with identifying individuals 
with an active terrorist intent are more concerned with 
evidence of attack planning, the changes in thinking 
and behaviour that accompany an intent to cause harm, 
and evidence of terrorist capability. This threshold is an 
important one for counter-terrorist purposes. In the UK 
both MI5, charged with intelligence analysis, and the 
counter-terrorist police within the government Prevent 
strategy, independently assess the threat of extremist 
violence either side of this threshold; the former for 
‘Pursue’ purposes and the latter for ‘Prevent’ purposes, 
though the endeavour is very similar. Risk assessment 
therefore remains core to much of the counter-terrorist 
effort of intelligence agencies and policing in the UK, 
and it is hoped that this directory will contribute to the 
recent recommendation for “a refreshed approach to 
research and innovation, including academic, private 
sector and international partners.” 4
None of these frameworks claim to be able to 
straightforwardly predict future violence. In accordance 
with good practice in risk assessment, most claim 
instead to be able to identify behaviours or scenarios 
that signal when and in what circumstances an attack 
is more likely, in order to inform efforts to prevent it 
through appropriate action. Each is presented as work 
in progress, within a standard template that allows for 
some comparison across frameworks. The originators 
of each framework completed their own sections 1 
to 5, except for the ERG, which was completed by 
HMPPS as the copyright holder. For this reason they 
vary a little in terms of style, content and detail. A 
final section 6 addresses the strengths and limitations 
of each framework. These were completed not by the 
originators but by other risk assessment experts who 
were also in some cases experienced users, though the 
originators have also had sight of them and been invited 
to comment. Each section 6 therefore also varies 
4 See David Anderson QC’s report: Attacks in London and Manchester March-June 2017.
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/664682/Attacks_in_London_and_Manchester_
Open_Report.pdf. 3.47f
5 https://www.bps.org.uk/news-and-policy/ethical-guidelines-applied-psychological-practice-field-extremism-violent-extremism
6 Section 26 of the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 places a duty on public bodies to have “due regard to the need to prevent people 
from being drawn into terrorism”
somewhat in focus and style as they are the product of 
different expert reviewers. Section 6 should therefore 
only be read as the output of a sample of expert peer 
reviewer opinion. As the evidence base develops and 
more studies are published, and as more frameworks 
come on stream or are placed in the public domain, the 
entries and peer reviews can be updated.
GOOD PRACTICE
Although psychologists have been assessing violent 
patients or prisoners for their risk of re-offending for 
many years, the task of assessing the risk of individuals 
carrying out a first act of violence in the community 
is a more recent endeavour that is altogether more 
difficult, as most approaches are predicated on the 
understanding that past behaviour is the best predictor 
of future behaviour. Without evidence of past violence, 
such assessments are informed either by intelligence 
that an individual is connected to a terrorist network, 
possibly engaged in an extremist ideology and/or 
potentially involved in terrorist plotting, or is nursing 
an idiosyncratic grievance and possibly making 
targeted threats of harm that may or may not be 
seriously intended. More worryingly, they may not 
be declaring intent at all, at least not publicly, thereby 
successfully remaining under the radar and preserving 
the element of surprise. Judgments need to be made 
about whether the threat is real, what form it might take 
and how imminent it may be, based on what is often 
incomplete information from indirect sources, without 
the opportunity to interview the individual concerned. 
Making assessments in such circumstances can also 
raise ethical issues for practitioner psychologists for 
whom requests for assessment before an offence has 
been committed may not be considered legitimate 
within the boundaries of their code of conduct and 
ethics. Guidance has recently been published by the 
British Psychological Society that addresses the ethical 
challenges of working with extremist violence,5 and 
that have been highlighted by the UK Prevent duty.6
The development of frameworks to assess extremist 
violence has taken place against a backdrop of 
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academic research into the methodology of violence 
risk assessment in general that has lost confidence in 
‘non-discretionary’ actuarial approaches that attempt 
to place an individual in a low, medium or high risk 
category on the basis of their conformity to a fixed 
offender profile. Such approaches have lost currency for 
all forms of violence,7 and especially for targeted and 
terrorist violence.8 9 They assume that dangerousness 
resides within the individual, is fixed, either present 
or not, and can be measured by summing risk factors; 
whereas for all forms of violence, dangerousness is now 
viewed as an emerging construct that is the product 
of an interaction between push and pull factors in the 
individual case, within a particular familial, social, 
cultural and/or political context, and in the absence of 
protective factors.
The ‘discretionary’ approach of Structured Professional 
Judgment (SPJ) is now recognised universally as 
good assessment practice.10 11 It provides guidance to 
practitioners to structure their judgments of risk by 
means of a scaffold of key indicators, often grouped 
into broader domains that can demonstrate a link 
(theoretical and/or empirical) with the violence to 
be prevented. It produces a holistic assessment that 
integrates the information available from a range of 
sources that has become central to an interagency 
process of information exchange that informs risk 
management, in both treatment settings and in 
threat assessment. It allows practitioners to bridge 
gaps in the knowledge base and is applied within a 
cycle of referral, prioritisation, further investigation, 
information sharing and formulation, followed by 
more or less active intervention and/or management. 
In treatment settings it includes direct interview with, 
and ideally the collaboration of the perpetrator; in a 
7 Hart, S.D., & Cooke, D.J., (2013). Another look at the (im)precision of individual risk estimates made using actuarial risk assessment 
instruments. Behavioral Sciences and the Law, 31, 81-102.
8 Borum, R., (2015). Assessing risk for terrorism involvement. Journal of Threat Assessment and Management, 2, 63-87.
9 Borum, R., Fein, R., Vossekuil, B., & Berglund, J. (1999). Threat assessment: Defining an approach for evaluating risk of targeted violence. 
Behavioral Sciences & The Law, 17 (3), 323-337.
10 Hart, S.D. & Logan, C. (2011). Formulation of violence risk using evidence based assessments: The Structured Professional Judgment 
approach. In P. Sturmey & M. McMurran (Eds.), Forensic case formulation (pp. 83-106). Chichester, UK: Wiley Blackwell.
11 Logan, C & Lloyd, M (2018). Violent extremism: A comparison of approaches to assessing and managing risk. Legal & Criminological 
Psychology. DOI: 10.1111/lcrp.12140, p.3
12 U.S Department of Justice FBI. Making Prevention a Reality: Identifying, Assessing, and Managing the Threat of Targeted Attacks. 
Behavioral Analysis Unit – National Center for the Analysis of Violent Crime.
13 Skeem, J.L. & Monahan, J. (2011). Current Directions in Violence Risk Assessment. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 20(1), 38-
42, doi.org/10.1177/0963721410397271
14 Monahan, J. (2015). The individual risk assessment of terrorism: Recent developments. Virginia Public Law and Legal Theory Research 
Paper, 57, 520–534. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn. 2665815
15 Sarma, K. M. (2017). Risk assessment and the prevention of radicalization from nonviolence into terrorism. American Psychologist, 72(3), 
278-288. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/amp0000121
16 See footnote 10, p.7
threat assessment context, face to face contact with 
the individual threatening violence is rare, and more 
emphasis is placed on intelligence, risk factors, warning 
behaviours, stressors, and possible precipitating events 
and mitigators.12 In a fast moving threat scenario there 
are many gaps to be bridged and timely decisions to 
be made about whether to investigate further, monitor 
events or intervene to actively manage the risk, or effect 
an arrest.
SPJ frameworks are now available for a range of violent 
offending and have been recommended for use with 
extremist violence.13 14 15 It should be acknowledged 
that there is a continuum of SPJ approaches from the 
fully operationalised that require scenario planning 
and formulation, to leaner approaches that support an 
appraisal of the pattern of risk (and protective) factors 
in the individual case to inform a summary risk rating 
of high, medium, or low. It is generally understood 
that the more complete approach is the preserve of 
professionals such as psychologists, behavioural 
scientists or probation officers, and that the leaner 
approach is more suited to those with operational 
expertise and experience. These two approaches have 
been characterised in the literature as SPJ full-fat and 
SPJ lite.16 The originators of the frameworks featured 
here all claim that their framework conforms to some 
extent with this approach, in that risk (and ideally 
protective) factors are formulated into an overall risk 
judgment that informs proportionate risk monitoring 
pre-crime, or appropriate risk management post crime. 
It is probably true to say that some were deliberately 
designed to conform to this approach, and that others 
have migrated towards it following revisions. The IVP 
was originally developed as a checklist-based screening 
instrument but has been re-badged an SPJ framework 
8 
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in the directory since the 2006 study of its utility that 
suggested that gaps in information needed to be bridged 
by a human led assessment of the case.17 Similarly 
in 2015 the TRAP-18 was labelled an investigative 
template,18 but has since been re-badged an SPJ 
framework in the directory as its function has evolved. 
This approach allows assessors to make both common 
sense and theoretical sense of the function of the 
extremist identity, ideology and/or violence to the 
individual, rather than assessing their degree of 
conformity to a fixed terrorist profile that research 
has confirmed does not exist.19 Hart (2009) has stated, 
in the context of sexual violence, that an assessment 
approach should be judged “to the extent that it 
coheres with the facts of the case, common sense 
views of the world, and (where applicable) scientific 
research and theory.”20 Meloy also makes it explicit 
in his description of the TRAP-18 that his aim is to 
identify the pattern that emerges from the constellation 
of warning behaviours as a Gestalt which the clinician 
constructs from experience, stressing the importance 
of clinical insight (see TRAP-18 entry). Such factors 
should also be ‘dynamic, iterative, and responsive to 
change’.21 An important feature of the SPJ approach 
that requires more clarity is the precise role of 
protective factors, which are variously referred to in 
the different framework entries.22 Only the VERA-2R 
explicitly lists six protective and risk-mitigating factors, 
which are essentially the reverse of six key risk factors. 
Meloy asserts in the entry for the TRAP-18 that “the 
absence of certain indicators, both proximal warning 
behaviours and distal characteristics are protective” 
but this is far from established. A recent paper by 
Warren et al (2018) proposes a new theoretical model 
to explain attacks perpetrated by radicalised civilians 
that incorporates risk and protective factors as the 
end points of the same continuum, individualised to 
capture the particular protective influences that bear 
on particular risk factors to more precisely inform 
individual risk analysis and management. There is 
more work to be done to achieve a consensus about the 
precise mechanism of the protective function.  
17 Egan, V., Cole, J., Cole, B., Alison, L., Alison, E., Waring, S. & Elntib, S. (2016) Can you identify violent extremists using a screening 
checklist and open-source intelligence alone? Journal of Threat Assessment and Management, 3 (1). pp. 21-36.
18 Meloy, J. R., Roshdi, K., Glaz-Ocik, J., & Hoffmann, J. (2015). Investigating the individual terrorist in
Europe. Journal of Threat Assessment and Management, 2, 140–152.
19 See footnote 7
20 Hart, S. (2009). Evidence-based assessment of risk for sexual violence. Chapman Journal of Criminal Justice. 1, 143-165. p.160.
21 www.RMAScotland.gov.uk/FRAME, Principle 11.
22 Warren, J.I., Leviton, A.C.R., Reed, J., Saathoff, G.B., Patterson, T.D., Richards, L.A., & Fancher, A.D. (2018) Operationalizing Theory: A 
Moral Situational Action Model for Extremist Violence. Journal of Threat Assessment and Management. V. 5, No. 4.205-226.
Our task therefore in evaluating these frameworks is 
to ensure that they allow the assessor to formulate the 
individual case by identifying the factors that motivate 
and incentivise engagement, and the potentially 
idiosyncratic influences that protect against it. These 
drivers should be aspects of the individual that provide 
common sense explanations for the adoption of an 
extremist identity, ideology or terrorist intention, that 
also make theoretical sense, and that allow for the 
possibility of a different life choice in the future.
VALIDATION
The frameworks presented here all represent work in 
progress and none are yet fully validated. This is a 
task that presents multiple challenges, particularly for 
violent extremism for which the evidence base is thin, 
perpetrators few in number though disproportionately 
damaging, the social and political context complex, 
and the range of agencies and practitioners involved 
significant, each with different skills, approaches and 
priorities. Assuming sufficient relevant information to 
inform the assessment, the validity of a risk assessment 
framework is determined by how reliably it performs 
and whether the identified factors are actually causal 
and therefore valid indicators of risk (criminogenic). 
The assessment framework should structure and guide 
the assessor’s task, so that close agreement can be 
achieved by different assessors working independently 
of each other with the same information. Reliability is 
commonly established through inter-rater reliability 
studies, and these are cited in the directory where 
available.  
The validity of SPJ frameworks cannot be established 
as in conventional psychometric scales by internal 
analysis of the contribution that each item makes to a 
total score that measures a unitary construct such as 
intelligence or neuroticism that can be independently 
evidenced. There is no such thing as a propensity 
to terrorism that can be measured by means of a 
single scale, and the factors within SPJ domains 
9 
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apply differentially to different terrorist roles and 
personalities. They broadly identify the range of 
push and pull factors and personal vulnerabilities 
that have been identified in the literature, and rely 
on professional judgment for a formulation of what 
particular combination of risk and/or needs apply 
to the individual being assessed, and what protective 
influences might mitigate that risk. A recent study 
systematically reviewed 148 studies from peer reviewed 
journals that identified empirical factors that predicted 
radicalisation and classified them as push factors, 
pull factors or personal factors.23 Although there was 
a broad convergence of findings, only 19 (12%) used 
a control group and only one used a matched control 
group of non-violent extremists. Access to terrorists 
and matched controls is difficult to achieve in the 
real world but remains a gold standard for confirming 
that proposed risk factors are actually valid indicators 
of risk and are not also present in radicals with no 
terrorist intent. 
The single study referred to above compared open 
source Al Qaeda influenced terrorist case studies from 
Canada and Europe with 28 Radicals, all of whom 
were associates of a terrorist in the sample but who had 
not engaged in terrorist violence themselves, twenty of 
whom were interviewed as a matched control group.24 
Both groups shared a grievance towards the West, 
support for a Caliphate and for defensive violence, but 
the terrorists held strident beliefs in their supremacy 
and the inferiority of the West, lacked critical thinking 
and made a deliberate decision to reject their host 
society and embrace a romantic notion of restoring 
their honour through violence. Protective factors were 
good role models growing up, in-depth understanding 
of Islam, respect for their host society and openness to 
new learning. 
Two recent studies compared by means of the TRAP-
18, groups with and without violent intent. The first 
compared thirty ‘sovereign citizens’ who planned or 
23 Vergani, M., Iqbal,M., Ilbahar, E., Barton, G. (2018). The Three Ps of Radicalization: Push, Pull and Personal. A Systematic Scoping 
Review of the Scientific Evidence about Radicalization Into Violent Extremism. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism. https://doi.org/10.1080/105761
0X.2018.1505686
24  Bartlett, J. & Miller, C. (2012). The Edge of Violence: Towards Telling the Difference Between Violent and Non-Violent Radicalization. 
Terrorism and Political Violence. V.24, Iss.1. 
25  Challacombe, D.J. & Lucas, P.A., (2018) Postdicting Violence in Sovereign Citizen Actors. An exploratory test of the TRAP-18. Journal of 
Threat Assessment and Management. Dec 2018.  
26  Hoffmann, J., Meloy, J.R., Guldimann, A. & Ermer, A. (2011). Attacks on German public figures, 1968-2004: Warning behaviors, 
potentially lethal and nonlethal acts, psychiatric status, and motivations. Behavioral Sciences and the Law, 29, 155-179.
27  Meloy, J.R., Hoffmann, J., Roshdi, K. & Guldimann, A. (2014). Some warning behaviors discriminate between school shooters and other 
students of concern. Journal of Threat Assessment and Management 1: 203-211.
executed violent offences with 29 who carried out 
non-violent offences.25 Six of the proximal factors and 
four of the distal factors significantly discriminated 
between them, and the total score was able to correctly 
predict 76% of the violent offenders. Examination of 
these indicates that ‘last resort behaviours’, ‘pathway 
planning behaviours’ and ‘identification with a 
commando identity’ were powerful proximal predictors 
and ‘personal grievance, framed by ideology’ and 
‘criminal violence’ were powerful distal predictors. 
The second study compared 33 lethal lone actor 
terrorists with 23 subjects of concern who lacked clear 
intent or were successfully diverted from this intention 
and their cases closed. Five proximal and four distal 
factors significantly discriminated between them. 
The same ‘last resort behaviours’, ‘pathway planning/
preparation behaviours’ and ‘identification as an agent 
or soldier for a cause’ emerged as powerful correlates, 
with the addition of ‘energy burst’ and the absence of 
a ‘directly communicated threat’. Among the distal 
factors ‘ideological framing’, ‘changes in thinking and 
behaviour’, ‘creativity and innovation’ and the absence 
of ‘mental disorder’ were all significant correlates. 
The configuration indicates that every attacker had at 
least one proximal warning behaviour and most of the 
distal characteristics were present in the majority of 
the attackers and nonattackers, confirming the utility 
of the approach that recommends that the presence of 
any one proximal characteristic should be followed 
by active management of the case while the presence 
of only distal characteristics should result in active 
monitoring of the case.   
Other ‘known outcome’ studies exploring the 
performance of the TRAP-18 indicators retrospectively 
with actual cases reveal that nine attackers with more 
lethal intent had a greater psychopathology than 5 
with less lethal intent;26 nine school shooters showed 
a pattern of warning behaviours that 31 empty 
threateners did not;27 15 lone actor terrorists and 
7 group actor terrorists shared 6 of the 8 warning 
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behaviours with the exception of direct threats that 
were not made by group actors. There was significant 
similarity between them in terms of grievance framed 
by ideology, and changes in thinking and emotion, but 
more lone actors than group actors showed evidence 
of psychopathology;28 (Meloy et al, 2015); 70% of 
111 lone actor terrorists, including Islamist, Far Right 
and single-issue terrorists shared at least half or more 
of the indicators, suggesting more commonality than 
difference between them.29 
Such studies touch on another aspect of SPJ frameworks 
that bears on their coherence and validity: the extent 
to which the risk factors are theorised and able to 
provide a degree of explanation for the individual’s 
extremist behaviour. In this respect a distinction may 
be made between risk factors that are intrinsically 
indicative of risk such as Direct threats, Leakage 
of an intent to do harm (TRAP-18), or Planning or 
preparing for a terrorist attack (VERA-2R), and those 
whose link with risk is less direct but potentially more 
explanatory, such as ‘Changes in thinking or emotion’ 
(TRAP-18) or ‘Over-identification with group, cause 
or ideology’ (the ERG22+). To the extent that a factor 
directly communicates violent intent it does not need a 
theoretical explanation for its role, but where a factor 
is not a direct indicator of harm, then some explanation 
for its role is necessary. Such a factor needs to make 
both psychological sense, and be able to demonstrate 
a direct functional link with the adoption of extremist 
identity/ideology, or the development of attitudes and 
behaviour that are consistent with terrorist intent. 
Such explanations add value to the assessment in 
helping to explain the individual’s motivations, inform 
subsequent intervention and risk management options, 
and contribute to the framework’s evidence base.30 
Postdictive studies such as that with sovereign citizens 
above have been recommended to test the performance 
of a framework retrospectively with known outcome 
case studies,31 providing a measure of their criterion or 
concurrent validity, as well as a means of comparing 
the profile of different ideological groups of those 
either side of the threshold of violence as above. 
The main barriers to the efficacy of such studies are 
28 Meloy, J.R., Roshdi, K., Glaz-Ocik, J. & Hoffmann, J. (2015). Investigating the individual terrorist in Europe. Journal of Threat Assess 
Management 2: 140-152.
29 Meloy, J.R. & Gill, P. (2016). The lone actor terrorist and the TRAP-18. J of Threat Assessment and Management 3: 37-52.
30 See footnote 10, (p.11)
31 Monahan, J. (2012). The individual risk assessment of terrorism. Psychology, Public Policy, and Law, 18, 167–205. http://dx.doi.
org/10.1037/a0025792
the influence of confirmatory or hindsight bias in 
judging whether an indicator is evidenced or not, 
and of the self-fulfilling function of indicators that 
are elements of the behaviour that is to be predicted, 
effectively confounding independent and dependent 
variables. Several postdictive studies have been carried 
out with the TRAP-18 that are vulnerable to such 
criticism. However, the application of the TRAP-18 
in postdictive research as above has also produced 
new learning where studies have contrasted targeted 
violence with more or less lethal intent, lone actors and 
group actors and different ideological groups on the 
TRAP-18 indicators. They have shown, for example, 
that more lone actor than group actor terrorists show 
evidence of psychopathology; that greater lethality 
is correlated with greater psychopathology, and that 
those threatening targeted violence often issue direct 
threats, whereas terrorists do not. 
Most of the frameworks included in this directory 
claim to be suitable for all extremist ideologies, with 
the explicit exception of the IR-46, whose originators 
are currently developing alternative frameworks for Far 
Right and Extreme Left Wing groups. More research 
is needed to clarify commonalities and differences. 
Concurrent validity was found between the overall 
summary risk ratings for the MLG Version 2 and the 
HCR-20 by the authors of the MLG, confirming that 
those at risk for terrorist violence are also at risk for 
general violence, though this finding does not imply 
that anyone judged to be at risk for general violence is 
also at risk for terrorist violence. The MLG Individual 
and Individual-Group domains were found to overlap 
significantly with the VERA2, whereas Group 
and Group-Society domains overlapped very little, 
confirming that the two frameworks measure different 
aspects of group based violence (see MLG entry). 
These differences are important; identifying which 
frameworks work best for which client group and in 
what circumstances, and deploying them appropriately 
is part of the expertise of risk assessment that advances 
with the benefit of such findings.     
It is hoped that with the publication of this directory, 
risk assessment practitioners, intelligence analysts and 
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the academic research community will be able to access 
more of the tools available for assessing ideologically 
motivated targeted and/or group based violence, and be 
inspired to approach the authors or copyright owners 
directly for permission to use them, or for training. 
Cooperative research is needed to build evidence for 
their reliability, validity and utility, to carry out more 
matched controlled studies, to test frameworks against 
known outcome case studies, and contribute to the 
knowledge base that will accrue from their use. More 
clarity about what discriminates between targeted 
violence and terrorist attacks, between lone and group 
actors, and between different ideological groups is 
needed. This directory is intended to contribute to this 
work in progress.
 EXTREMISM RISK ASSESSMENT: A DIRECTORY
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32 Karmani, A (2009). Reducing the influences that Radicalise Prisoners. London Probation Trust. Unpublished internal report.
33 A Process Evaluation of the Structured Risk Guidance for Extremist Offenders. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/
attachment_data/file/661787/process-evaluation-srg-extremist-offender-report.pdf
1. PROVENANCE
1.1 ORIGINATING AUTHORS, 
PROFESSIONAL AFFILIATION, ROLE 
AND CONTEXT
HMPPS developed and owns the intellectual property 
of the ERG. HMPPS is responsible for training 
and registration of assessors, as well as its ongoing 
development and adaptation in line with evolving 
HMPPS population requirements and emerging 
literature and research.
CONTACT EMAIL
Interventions_businessenquiries@noms.gsi.gov.uk
1.2 BACKGROUND AND 
PROVENANCE
The Extremism Risk Guidance (ERG) is best 
described as a Structured Professional Judgment tool 
(SPJ); a formulation guided assessment of risk and 
need. When the development of what we now know 
as the ERG began, there were no known established 
methodologies for assessing risk and need amongst 
extremist offenders, and with the increasing number 
of individuals being convicted of extremist offences, 
and developing legislation (e.g., Terrorism Act 2006), 
an assessment was required that could provide an 
empirically-informed systematic and transparent 
approach to assessing risk and need amongst convicted 
extremists.
The ERG was informed by the international terrorist 
literature, from casework with up to 50 convicted 
terrorist offenders, and from a comparative analysis 
of the criminogenic profiles of extremist offenders 
compared to mainstream criminal offenders from 
OASys (Offender Assessment System) group data. 
Casework findings were cross-referenced against 
independent research into the radicalising influences in 
the backgrounds of 12 extremist offenders on license in 
the community.32 These findings were reviewed by an 
advisory panel of experts in the field who suggested a 
case formulation approach based on functional analysis 
of the individual’s offending, to identify the factors 
relevant to involvement in extremism and to extremist 
offending, to inform a structured professional judgment 
framework (Lloyd & Dean, 2015).
1.3 DATE OF FIRST PUBLICATION OR 
ORIGIN AND SCOPE OF USE
The ERG manual is an internal publication. Extremism 
Risk Guidance. ERG22+ Structured Professional 
Guidelines for Assessing Risk of Extremist Offending. 
Offender Services & Implementation Group. NOMS 
(2011).
1.4 HAS THE FRAMEWORK BEEN 
PEER REVIEWED?
During the development of the ERG, an independent 
process evaluation of the first version, the Structured 
Risk Guidance (SRG33) was conducted by the National 
Centre for Social Research, which focused on its 
content, delivery and implementation (Webster et al., 
2017). 
This evaluation, along with the feedback from an 
exercise with 35 probation officers with experience 
of extremist offenders, led to further review and 
development of the framework and the introduction of 
a three dimensional model. 
The expert advisory group continued to oversee this 
work as it developed. The final version of the ERG was 
peer-reviewed within HMPPS and externally by two of 
the experts from the advisory group. The ERG22+ as 
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it stands today was mainstreamed across Prisons and 
Probation by HMPPS in 2011.
1.5 AIMS OF THE FRAMEWORK
The ERG aims to:
 y Assess the extent to which an individual is 
engaged or committed to an extremist group, 
cause or ideology, and is motivated to offend on 
their behalf.
 y Assess the extent to which an individual holds a 
current readiness or intention to offend.
 y Assess the extent to which an individual is capable 
of, or has the resources to carry out a further 
extremist offence (particularly acts of terrorism 
which cause serious and significant harm).
 y Inform judgments about their likelihood of 
contributing to, or committing a future extremist 
offence.
 y Inform sentence planning, including 
recommending any interventions or other 
strategies that may be appropriate to manage an 
individual’s risk, and support them in moving on 
with their lives without offending.
1.6 DESCRIPTION OF APPROACH
The ERG is an SPJ tool, a formulation guided 
assessment of risk and need. Assessors are asked to 
consider the 22+ factors, and record and evidence those 
significant to an individual’s pathway into extremism 
(i.e., engagement), how they overcame inhibitions 
against offending and/or harming others (i.e., intent) 
and their ability to contribute to, or commit a further 
extremist offence (i.e., capability). Assessors are then 
asked, based on their formulation to comment on the 
individual’s risk and need, what might protect against 
further offending, and make recommendations to 
facilitate desistance and support disengagement from 
extremist ideology.
The ERG is not an actuarial measure. It was not 
designed to determine guilt, or to predict whether an 
individual will reoffend; it was designed to be used 
as part of multidisciplinary decision-making process 
to inform proportionate risk management, to increase 
understanding and confidence in front-line staff and in 
decision-makers working with extremist offenders, and 
to facilitate effective and targeted intervention (Lloyd 
& Dean, 2015).
1.7 TARGET POPULATION
All individuals in England and Wales convicted of an 
extremist offence (under terrorism and in some cases, 
other legislation where the offence is clearly extremist 
in nature) are subject to an ERG assessment; generally, 
within the first twelve months of sentence. In some 
cases, individuals for whom there is significant concern 
regarding possible involvement in extremism but who 
were convicted of an offence unrelated to extremism 
may be subject to an ERG.
1.8 FOCUS OF THE ASSESSMENT
The ERG focuses on the individual, but it also identifies 
the role of factors and circumstances external to the 
individual that may have influenced their engagement 
and/or involvement in extremism. Consideration needs 
to be given to the group, cause or ideology that is being 
supported, the individual motivations and protective 
and contextual factors, as well as their role within the 
extremist activity.
1.9 DIRECT OR INDIRECT 
ASSESSMENT?
When undertaking the assessment assessors are 
encourage to work responsively with the individual 
to create a collaborative assessment that allows them 
to provide their own account and insights, to create 
an understanding and formulation of their pathway 
into extremist offending and assess the risk of further 
offending. Assessors are also encouraged to use as many 
sources of information as possible in its completion.
1.10 GENERIC OR SPECIFIC TO 
IDEOLOGY?
Generic. Those identified by HMPPS as extremist 
offenders include anyone convicted under terrorist 
legislation or anyone whose offending is allied to an 
extremist ideology that justifies violence or illegal 
conduct in pursuit of its objectives. This includes far 
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right, animal rights activists or others pursuing single 
issues.
1.11 THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS
The ERG is grounded in a number of mainstream 
psychological theories and incorporates amongst 
others, the following key theories and concepts:
 y Ajzen & Fishbein’s theory of reasoned action.34
 y Suedfeld’s theory of cognitive integrative 
complexity.35
 y Altemeyer ’s findings concerning authoritarian 
dominance and authoritarian submission.36
 y Tajfel & Turner’s Social identity Theory of Inter-
Group Behaviour.37
 y Schwartz et al’s Identity Theory of Terrorism.38
 y Bjorgo & Horgan’s model of push/pull factors in 
engagement and disengagement.39
 y Horgan’s characterisation of ‘socialisation into 
terrorism’.40
 y McCauley & Segal’s observation on the dynamic 
nature of engagement and disengagement.41
 y Ward’s Good Lives Model.42
2. STRUCTURE
2.1 AN OUTLINE OF THE STRUCTURE
The ERG is three dimensional in its structure. The 
dimensions ‘engagement’ and ‘intent’ seek to measure 
the longitudinal journey of an individual taking into 
account a number of factors which unfold in interaction 
with one another in different degrees and sequences 
across a number of developing pathways. The third 
34 Ajzen, I., & Fishbein, M. (2005). The influence of attitudes on behavior. In Albarracin, D., Johnson, BT., Zanna MP. (Eds.) The Handbook 
of Attitudes. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
35 Suedfeld, P (2010). The Cognitive Processing of Politics and Politicians: Archival Studies of Conceptual and Integrative Complexity. 
Journal of Personality, V.78(6), 1669-702
36 Altemeyer, B. (2004). Highly Dominating, Highly Authoritarian Personalities. The Journal of Social Psychology, 144(4), 421-447.
37 Tajfel, H & Turner, J (1986) The Social Identity Theory of Inter-group Behaviour, in Worchel, S & Austin, W. The Psychology of Inter-group 
Behaviour. Chicago: Nelson-Hall.
38 Schwartz, S J, Dunkel, C S & Waterman, A.S (2009). Terrorism: An Identity Theory Perspective. Studies in International Conflict & 
Terrorism. 32:537-559.
39 Bjorgo,T & Horgan, J (Eds.) Leaving Terrorism Behind: Individual and Collective Disengagement. Oxon: Routledge.
40 Horgan, J. (2005 ) The Psychology of Terrorism. Routledge.
41 McCauley, C and Segal, M, ‘Terrorist Individuals and Terrorist Groups: The Normal Psychology of Extreme Behaviour’ in J Groebel and 
JH Goldstein (Eds) Terrorism (Seville: Publicaciones de la Universidad de Sevilla, 1989. p 45).
42 Ward, T. & Stewart, C.A. (2003). Criminogenic needs and human needs: A theoretical model Psychology, Crime and Law, 9, 125-143.
dimension, ‘capability’ serves a different function in 
the formulation, essentially looking at the operational 
capacity to cause harm.
Within the ERG, engagement is defined as a process 
by which an individual becomes interested in, involved 
in, committed to, and/or identified with an extremist 
group, cause and/or ideology (NOMS, 2011a). This 
process is often referred to elsewhere in the literature 
as radicalisation. The factors within the engagement 
dimension include for example, need to redress 
injustice, need for identity, meaning and belonging, 
need for status, susceptibility to indoctrination, 
need to dominate others, political/moral motivation, 
transitional periods, the influence of family and/or 
friends, opportunistic involvement and mental health.
The term ‘intent’ refers to the mind-set associated with 
a readiness to act illegally and/or violently on behalf of 
a group, cause and/or ideology. The intent dimension 
is best described as the end point of an engagement 
process if uninterrupted, and includes for example, 
over-identification (as an end state of engagement and 
identification), us and them thinking, dehumanisation 
(as an end state of us and them thinking), and harmful 
objectives; all of which represent a state of mind where 
inhibitions against offending and causing harm have 
been overcome. It is this dimension which bears most 
heavily on risk.
The third dimension ‘capability’ seeks to measure an 
offender’s abilities to carry out an act of terrorism and/
or cause serious harm (NOMS, 2011a). Capability is a 
mixture of static, dynamic, risk-neutral and risk-specific 
variables, and is an operational rather than a clinical 
indicator. The capability dimension includes factors 
such as skills, competencies, networks, resources and 
criminal history, all of which act as enabling factors 
(NOMS, 2011a).
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2.2 ARE PROTECTIVE FACTORS 
INCLUDED?
Yes. Assessors are asked as part of the ERG to consider 
alongside the 22+ risk factors, how any of these or 
additional factors may be mitigated by protective 
influences, and support an individual’s desistance and 
disengagement from extremism.
2.3 IS THE FRAMEWORK SENSITIVE 
TO POLITICAL CONTEXT?
Yes. Assessors are asked to pay attention to the political 
and social context within which an individual becomes 
involved in extremism and offends (Lloyd & Dean, 
2015), and to consider how the static or changing 
political and social context might impact future risk 
and need.
2.4 RISK SEEN AS STATIC OR 
DYNAMIC?
Risk is treated as dynamic; all risk factors within 
the ERG other than two of the capability factors and 
arguably some mental health issues are dynamic and 
susceptible to change.
2.5 TIME-FRAME FOR RISK 
JUDGMENTS
As a dynamic framework, the ERG assessment has 
limited longevity and should be reviewed periodically 
to reflect progress or change, in order to inform risk and 
sentence management decisions.
2.6 ANY REFERENCE TO IMMINENCE 
OF HARM?
Not directly, this is not the prime purpose of the 
ERG. The assessment does however comment on any 
risk triggers, enabling or disinhibiting influences or 
circumstances in different scenarios. Where there is a 
risk of imminent harm, or harm in particular scenarios, 
this information is fed into processes concerned with 
the day-to-day risk management of an individual.
2.7 INFORMATION REQUIREMENT
Individuals subject to an ERG are asked to participate 
in the assessment process, either through interview or 
in writing. The ERG is completed based on written 
information when individuals decline participation, 
but they are still given an opportunity to review the 
completed ERG. Assessors are encouraged to use as 
many sources of information as possible, including in 
some cases, speaking to family. The completed ERG is 
disclosed to the individual in the context of sentence 
planning and management.
2.8 IS SCENARIO PLANNING 
INCLUDED?
Not in the way that other SPJ tools in the field of 
violence or sexual offending risk assessments instruct 
scenario planning, but assessors are encouraged in the 
guidance to use the case formulation in this way.
2.9 ARE THERE ANY RED FLAGS?
No red flags as such but the dimensions of Intent and 
Capability bear more directly on the risk of extremist 
offending.
2.10 OUTPUT – RISK BANDING OR LIVE 
RISK/THREAT MANAGEMENT ADVICE?
The ERG does not propose risk bandings but the 
formulation is intended to be used to inform risk 
management.
The assessment includes a narrative explaining those 
factors significant to an individual’s engagement and 
involvement in extremism, and their offending, a case 
formulation based on the SPJ guidance, an assessment 
of risk and need, and recommendations regarding how 
best to manage risk and target intervention. A record 
sheet is provided as an ‘aide memoir’ which assessors 
may review but do not need to code or score. As stated 
previously, if there is imminent risk of harm, or risk 
of harm more generally, there are existing mechanisms 
within HMPPS into which this information would be 
inputted.
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2.11 IS PRACTICE GUIDANCE 
PROVIDED?
Yes. Guidance is provided to trained and registered 
users.
3. TRAINING AND LICENSING
3.1 THE CONTENT OF TRAINING
Two day training:
1. How to use structured professional guidelines to 
assess risk of extremist offending.
2. A brief history of the ERG; how the structured 
guidelines were developed, the context in which 
they were developed, the limitations of the 
evidence-base and scope for future refinement.
3. The key literature, evidence and theories upon 
which the structured guidelines have been 
developed.
4. How the guidelines are intended to be used and 
reported, including their scope and limitations.
5. The significant risk (and protective), factors and 
circumstances associated with extremist offending 
that need to be considered as part of a risk and 
needs assessment.
6. How to translate analysis of risk/protective factors 
and circumstances into conclusions about risk, 
and recommendations to inform decision making 
e.g., sentence management, interventions, release 
decisions etc.
7. How such assessments can be effectively reported.
8. Practice with three case studies.
3.2 OPTIMISED TO WHAT KIND OF 
ASSESSOR(S)?
ESSENTIAL
Chartered and registered psychologists or experienced 
probation officers required as part of their role to 
undertake assessments with convicted extremist 
offenders, and those for whom there are credible 
concerns about their potential for such offences.
DESIRABLE
Experience in completing psychologically informed 
risk assessment and formulation.
3.3 LICENSING
Those completing the training are licensed to use the 
ERG within HMPPS. There are both educational 
licences and commercial licences available. The 
commercial licence is currently on hold pending a 
review of the ERG. To date no commercial licences 
have been issued, however some US Probation Officers 
were trained in the ERG in 2017, and licences are being 
issued to them.
4. UTILITY AND ETHICAL 
PRACTICE
4.1 IS THE FRAMEWORK 
UNDERSTOOD BY STAKEHOLDERS 
AND ACCESSIBLE TO THEM?
HMPPS
Operational management: The ERG is well 
established within security departments that monitor 
extremist risk in custody.
Sentence management: The ERG is the established 
means of assessment for extremist offenders that informs 
prisoner category, sentence planning, interventions, 
parole decision making and risk management in 
custody via Pathfinder (the Extremist Risk Screen for 
assessing prison intelligence), and in the community 
via MAPPA.
GOVERNMENT
The terminology of the ERG (and in particular 
reference to the three dimensions) is used throughout 
Government.
EXTREMIST OFFENDERS
Seen as a respectful non-judgmental approach to 
assessment that treats them as individuals.
The process of assessment is collaborative and the 
report shared with offenders and their solicitors.
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The approach supports proportionate risk and sentence 
management; both in custody and whilst in the 
community under the supervision of the NPS.
4.2 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS
The following are observed:
 y An open, transparent and collaborative approach.
 y A focus on the offending as the target for change 
rather than an individual’s beliefs.
 y A recognition that engagement is dynamic, and 
that desistance and disengagement are possible.
 y A balanced and objective approach to risk 
assessment and management that is free from bias 
and proportionate to assessed risk and need.
5. PUBLICATION HISTORY
5.1 PUBLICATIONS
Lloyd, M. & Dean, C. (2015) The Development of 
Structured Guidelines for Assessing Risk in Extremist 
Offenders. The Journal of Threat Assessment and 
Management, Vol 2, Issue 1. pp 40-52.
Lloyd, M. (2016) Structured Guidelines for Assessing 
Risk in Extremist Offenders. Assessment and 
Development Matters, Vol 8, No 2. pp 15-18. British 
Psychological Society.
Webster, Kerr & Tompkins (2017) A Process 
Evaluation of the Structured Risk Guidance for 
Extremist Offenders. https://assets.publishing.
service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/
attachment_data/file/661787/process-evaluation-srg-
extremist-offender-report.pdf
Dean C., Lloyd, M., Keane, C., Powis, B., Randhawa 
K. (2018) Intervening with Extremist Offenders 
- A Pilot Study https://www.gov.uk/government/
publications/intervening-with-extremist-offenders-a-
pilot-study
5.2 PUBLICATIONS THAT BEAR ON 
INTER-RATER RELIABILITY
Pending. Study being completed by MOJ.
5.3 PUBLICATIONS THAT BEAR ON 
VALIDITY
Pending. Study submitted to peer-reviewed journal for 
publication.
5.4 FOLLOW UP STUDIES USING THE 
FRAMEWORK
Herzog-Evans, M. (2018) A comparison of two 
structured professional judgment tools for violent 
extremism and their relevance in the French context. 
European Journal of Probation 2018, Vol. 10(1) 3 –27.
6.  SUMMARY & EVALUATION
6.1 STRENGTHS
 y Linked to a treatment programme which addresses 
factors identified in the ERG: the Healthy Identity 
Intervention (HII).
 y Is both empirically informed by one on one 
casework and a comparative analysis of the 
criminogenic profiles of extremist offenders and 
mainstream criminal offenders, and theoretically 
informed by the international terrorist literature 
and mainstream psychological theories.
 y Provides quality assurance through requiring 
competence, experience and specialist training in 
assessors.
 y Completed in collaboration with the offender and 
contains their own insights.
 y Informs sentence planning, intervention and 
release planning for extremist offenders.
 y Development overseen by international expert 
advisory group.
 y Independent evaluation of first iteration by 
National Centre for Social Research (NatCen), 
UK.
 y Peer-reviewed by two members of the advisory 
group before implementation: Profs Stephen Hart 
and David Cook.
 y Supports the separate assessment of criminogenic 
needs for intervention purposes (Engagement 
dimension), and the likelihood of future extremist 
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offending for risk management purposes (Intent 
and Capability dimensions).
 y Factors are dynamic, with the exception of two 
of the capability factors and some mental health 
issues, so the framework is sensitive to change 
over time.
 y A strong ethical focus on the individual rights 
of the offender and concern not to pathologise 
extremist beliefs per se but to focus on the 
potential harm to society, and the rehabilitation 
and reintegration of the individual.
 y Fits the legal framework of the UK that includes 
terrorist pathway offences that fall short of 
terrorist violence.
 y The basis of the Extremist Risk Screen for 
those at risk of being drawn into terrorism. Has 
good face validity and utility with stakeholders, 
including offenders.
 y Has demonstrated utility with extremist offenders 
including Islamist, Far Right, Far Left, Animal 
Rights and other single issues, and gang members 
whose offending is influenced by group processes.
 y Allows the inclusion of any additional factor that 
can be shown to bear on risk or need.
 y Training provided and licences available to 
countries wishing to use the framework.
6.2 LIMITATIONS
 y Information on reliability and validity not yet 
available.
 y It has not been established that the factors in 
the ERG 22+ are either correlates or predictors 
of risk. Given the low base rate of extremist 
recidivism it may not be possible to validate their 
role for some time.
 y The ERG was developed on the limited 
international literature available at the time, and 
casework which focused on al-Qaeda inspired 
extremism. Further research and refinement is 
underway to ensure the ERG remains appropriate 
and responsive to different types of extremism, 
and different cohorts e.g., women and young 
people.
 y As with all assessments, the ERG 22+ is 
dependent upon the accuracy and extent of the 
information used. Incomplete or unreliable 
information could limit the weight that can be 
placed on the ERG, or aspects of it.
 y Remains the intellectual property of HMPPS, not 
available for casual use. 
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1. PROVENANCE
1.1 ORIGINATING AUTHORS, 
PROFESSIONAL AFFILIATION, ROLE 
AND CONTEXT
Executive project leaders within the KiM-project of the 
Dutch National Police.
CONTACT EMAIL:
To the attention of the KiM-project
cter.ik-dlr.landelijke-eenheid@politie.nl
1.2 BACKGROUND AND 
PROVENANCE
Empirical, knowledge based model. Developed from 
the pathways of known cases, triangulated against the 
literature and interviews with academic experts and the 
investigative and intelligence services. A theoretical 
model was developed and tested on three occasions and 
on 240 cases in total (of known radicalised Islamist 
individuals). Extensive analysis of this data underpins 
the model.
The Dutch National Police is the owner of the 
approaches developed by the project and responsible 
for its ongoing development.
1.3 DATE OF FIRST PUBLICATION OR 
ORIGIN AND SCOPE OF USE.
2009/2010 as internal publications.
2010 Intelligence and Security Informatics (ISI) 
‘Terrorist threat assessment with formal concept 
analysis’.
IR-46 has been operational within the Dutch National 
Police, Royal Constabulary since 2010, but use of the 
tool was optional for regional police units until January 
2015 when its use has been mandatory. Pilots 
are being conducted within some of the 'Regional 
Safety Houses' (multi-disciplinary teams that handle 
individual cases).
1.4 HAS THE FRAMEWORK BEEN 
PEER REVIEWED?
A feedback loop is used to continuously evaluate 
the model and keep it dynamic and up-to-date, 
by professionals and academics with expertise in 
terrorism; there is no peer reviewed published article 
on the instrument.
1.5 AIMS OF THE FRAMEWORK
 y To detect and map out signs of radical Islamist 
behaviour at an early stage
 y To determine from their religious experience and/
or social circumstances to what extent a person is 
‘ready’ to use violence
 y To detect how likely it is that a person would 
actually be able to carry out an attack.
 y To interpret the complex interaction between 
personality, behaviour and circumstances, since 
it provides insight into the stage or degree of 
radicalisation reached.
 y To provide an overview of the information 
available about an individual.
1.6 DESCRIPTION OF APPROACH
IR-46 is based on structured professional judgment 
(SPJ). An important principle is that the model is not 
intended to substitute for human interpretation. The 
model does not replace professional analysis, but helps 
in formulating judgments.
1.7 TARGET POPULATION
Pre-crime: Islamic Radicalised individuals in the 
community.
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1.8 FOCUS OF THE ASSESSMENT
The degree of radicalisation and extent to which 
the person sees violence as an acceptable means to 
'promote' or realise his/her ideals.
1.9 DIRECT OR INDIRECT 
ASSESSMENT?
In reality direct assessment is rarely achieved and the 
IR-46 is completed pre-crime as more information 
comes to light.
1.10 GENERIC OR SPECIFIC TO 
IDEOLOGY?
Specific to Islamic radicalisation only.
1.11 THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS
The theoretical basis for the model was the staircase 
to terrorism: Moghaddam (2005), but reviews of the 
performance of the model identified outcomes that 
didn’t fit this theory, so the model has been adjusted to 
accommodate empirical findings, though it still retains 
the concept of stages to radicalisation.
2. STRUCTURE
2.1 AN OUTLINE OF THE STRUCTURE
Two axes:
1) Ideology indicators (26)
2) Social Context indicators (20)
The two axes work in parallel. Depending on the 
individual case, ideology related indicators are more 
prominent than social context indicators, or vice 
versa. More information might lead to scoring more 
indicators, but more indicators do not automatically 
sum to a higher degree of radicalisation. The indicators 
relate either to phase or degree of radicalisation.
2.2 ARE PROTECTIVE FACTORS 
INCLUDED?
Protective factors are included and unlimited in the 
model.
2.3 IS THE FRAMEWORK SENSITIVE 
TO POLITICAL CONTEXT?
The framework is only concerned with Islamist 
offending but does not specifically refer to political 
context.
2.4 RISK SEEN AS STATIC OR 
DYNAMIC?
All indicators are dynamic and capable of change 
over time. The model does not predict, but assesses 
the current risk (as is). By repeating or updating the 
assessment the dynamics, ‘trends’ or developments 
come to light.
2.5 TIME-FRAME FOR RISK 
JUDGMENTS
The tool is not meant to be used ‘one time, stand-alone’, 
but should be part of an ongoing multi-disciplinary 
approach to monitoring and corrective action.
2.6 ANY REFERENCE TO IMMINENCE 
OF HARM? ANY RED FLAGS?
This is contained within the identification of the phase 
of the terrorist trajectory that the individual has reached. 
The focus pre-crime is on evidence of intentions and 
capabilities and the phase the individual has reached 
on a terrorist trajectory. The final phase is coded red in 
that it reflects a willingness/ readiness to use violence.
2.7 INFORMATION REQUIREMENT
The framework is used pre-crime in real time and 
necessarily operates with less information than is 
available post-crime. As more information becomes 
available over time from different agencies the risk 
picture can change, but this is real time snap shot 
information and not processed information that 
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allows theorised sense to be made of the individual’s 
psychology and motives. Conclusions about emerging 
risk are made with agreement from all the agencies 
involved as new information becomes available.
2.8 IS SCENARIO PLANNING 
INCLUDED?
Not in the pre-crime context. It is up to the assessor to 
judge what actions should or should not be taken.
2.9 OUTPUT – RISK BANDING OR LIVE 
RISK/THREAT MANAGEMENT ADVICE?
IR-46 output outcome:
An overview and professional analysis is provided of 
the evidence for the judgment (in terms of the presence/
absence of information) and reported to multi-agency 
meetings in the community, consisting of:
1. Internal/organisational directed advice:
a. clarifies what is unknown (blank spot) so 
the user(s) can focus on what needs to be 
collected.
b. clarifies inconsistencies in behaviour or 
statements to different agencies (police, 
council, probation service) so each agency has 
the whole picture going forward.
2. External/subject focussed advice: helps identify 
the ‘main source of the subject’s radicalisation 
(e.g., group/peer-relations, criminality (drugs, 
criminal past etc) or lack of opportunities/
alternatives).
B.1 IS PRACTICE GUIDANCE 
PROVIDED?
Guidelines are provided with the training
3. TRAINING & LICENSING
3.1 THE CONTENT OF TRAINING
Half day training:
1. Background of the model based knowledge 
approach and specifically the origin of IR-46.
2. Principles and drawback of the model as part of 
SPJ.
3. Literature studies, expert meetings, theoretical 
model.
4. The examined case studies and analyses.
5. Comparison with other models.
6. Current model and the indicators.
7. Toolbox: excel tool, guidelines, info-graph, 
folders, instruction video.
8. How to use the guidelines and the info-graph in 
combination with the excel tool.
9. Examples: how to use the tool and the outcome.
10. Interpretation of possible outcomes and the 
limitations.
11. Practice with case examples in small groups.
12. Discussion in full group.
3.2 OPTIMISED TO WHAT KIND OF 
ASSESSOR(S)?
ESSENTIAL
Practitioners within police, intelligence services, 
probation/prison service, who on a regular basis have 
to analyse information on relevance, assess risks or 
threats or report on individuals. Must be experienced 
with full access to the highest level of information. 
Assessors and case-managers from public prosecution, 
mental health, youth protection and probation services 
have been trained and are using the IR-46.
DESIRABLE
Analytical skills.
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3.3 LICENSING
There is not a formal licence necessary (yet). Though 
we strongly advise against the use of IR-46 without the 
proper training.
4. UTILITY & ETHICAL 
PRACTICE
4.1 IS THE FRAMEWORK 
UNDERSTOOD BY STAKEHOLDERS 
AND ACCESSIBLE TO THEM?
There are two versions of the model and its products:
1. Police (confidential).
2. Partners within the multi-agency meetings.
4.2 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS
Within the Dutch police it was decided that for 
every suspected) radicalised person an IR46 would 
be undertaken. The assessment takes place within 
a policing framework and individual rights are not 
specifically considered.
5. PUBLICATION HISTORY
5.1 PUBLICATIONS THAT BEAR ON 
INTER-RATER RELIABILITY
Not known.
5.2 PUBLICATIONS THAT BEAR ON 
VALIDITY
Not known.
5.3 FOLLOW UP STUDIES USING THE 
FRAMEWORK
Elzinga, P., Poelmans, J., et al. (2010) Terrorist Threat 
Assessment with Formal Concept Analysis. 
Published in: 2010 IEEE International Conference on 
Intelligence and Security Informatics. Date Added to 
IEEE Xplore: 14 June 2010.
6. SUMMARY & EVALUATION
6.1 STRENGTHS
• Strong utility for law enforcement staff policing the 
risk of radicalisation in the community and other 
agencies charged with managing this risk.
• Developed from the literature, triangulated with 
(group) interviews with academic and professional 
experts (police, intelligence services, public 
prosecution, city council, mental health etc.) and 
the pathways of known cases.
• Meaningful to stakeholders, is not complex and 
had good face validity.
• Structures multi-agency management of risk in 
the community and closes information gaps, 
preventing terrorist violence by early intervention, 
proportionate policing and effective information 
sharing.
• Assesses radicalisation separately from intent and 
capability, supporting proportionate management 
and avoiding over-zealous policing that has the 
potential to be counter-productive.
• A theoretical model was developed and tested 
on three occasions and on 240 cases in total (of 
known Islamist radicalised individuals). Extensive 
analysis of data underpins the model, but is not 
available in the public domain.
• Ongoing monitoring and review ensure that practice 
continues to develop as the shape of the risk shifts 
into a different form.
6.2 LIMITATIONS
 y Limited to the assessment of Islamist extremist 
offending.
 y Designed for pre-crime assessment only and 
does not therefore include the offender in the 
assessment process.
 y Assumes a radicalisation trajectory over time, 
though this is often not the case with those from a 
criminal background who, from recent evidence, 
are recruited within short timescales.
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 y Information about reliability and validity not 
known.
 y The framework not published, so no cross 
validation work against other frameworks has yet 
been possible.
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IDENTIFYING VULNERABLE PEOPLE (IVP)
1. PROVENANCE
1.1 ORIGINATING AUTHORS, 
PROFESSIONAL AFFILIATION, ROLE 
AND CONTEXT
University of Liverpool:
Professor Jonathon Cole, Reader in Psychological 
Sciences
Ben Cole, PhD, Dept. of Psychological Sciences
Professor Laurence Alison, Chair in Forensic 
Psychology
Emily Alison, Dept. of Psychological Sciences
CONTACT EMAIL:
joncole@liverpool.ac.uk
1.2 DESCRIPTION OF APPROACH
Developed as a checklist based screening instrument, 
though now conceived of as a Structured Professional 
Judgment tool.
1.3 BACKGROUND AND 
PROVENANCE
Items derived from a literature review and research 
into the open source background material on convicted 
violent extremists.
1.4 DATE OF FIRST PUBLICATION OR 
ORIGIN AND SCOPE OF USE
Developed in 2008, in use since 2010. 
As the IVP is freely available on the internet it is not 
known who has officially adopted it. 
The originator has spoken to numerous individuals in 
the UK, USA, and Canada who have discussed their 
use of the IVP.
1.5 HAS THE FRAMEWORK BEEN 
PEER REVIEWED?
During the development of the IVP there were many 
stakeholder meetings and peer reviews.
1.6 AIMS OF THE FRAMEWORK
To facilitate decision making among frontline 
practitioners around the proportionate initiation of 
employers’ safeguarding procedures, now replaced by 
the Prevent Duty.
1.7 TARGET POPULATION
Pre-crime. Any individual about whom there are 
radicalisation concerns in the community.
1.8 FOCUS OF THE ASSESSMENT
Vulnerability of recruitment to violent extremism.
1.9 DIRECT OR INDIRECT 
ASSESSMENT?
Direct, in that the tool is intended for use by public 
sector employees, such as a health professional or 
teacher to determine whether there is cause for concern 
about an individual’s potential radicalisation.
1.10 GENERIC OR SPECIFIC TO 
IDEOLOGY?
Generic, though indicators 1, 4, 10, 11, 15, and 16 are 
more relevant to Islamist extremism.
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1.11 THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS
The framework is predicated on rational choice 
theory, that individual actors are rational agents who 
take account of available information, probabilities of 
events, and potential costs and benefits in determining 
their preferences, and act consistently in choosing a 
self-determined best choice of action.
2. STRUCTURE
2.1 AN OUTLINE OF THE STRUCTURE
Generic risk indicators:
1. Cultural and/or religious isolation
2. Isolation from family
3. Risk taking behaviours
4. Sudden change in religious practice
5. Violent rhetoric
6. Negative peer influences
7. Isolated peer group
8. Hate Rhetoric
9. Political activism
10. Basic paramilitary training
11. Travel/Residence abroad
Red Flag indicators:
1. Death rhetoric
2. Member of an extremist group
3. Contact with known recruiters/extremists
4. Advanced paramilitary training
5. Overseas combat
2.2 ARE PROTECTIVE FACTORS 
INCLUDED?
NA.
2.3 IS THE FRAMEWORK SENSITIVE 
TO POLITICAL CONTEXT?
No specific reference to this.
2.4 RISK SEEN AS STATIC OR 
DYNAMIC?
Dynamic.
2.5 TIME-FRAME FOR RISK 
JUDGMENTS
The assessment informs a one-off referral after which 
the risk is managed by other public sector agencies.
2.6 ANY REFERENCE TO IMMINENCE 
OF HARM? ANY RED FLAGS?
Yes, Red Flag indicators are an explicit part of the 
framework.
2.7 INFORMATION REQUIREMENT
 Professional contact between a public sector professional 
such as a teacher or doctor, and an individual about 
whom there are radicalisation concerns.
2.8 IS SCENARIO PLANNING 
INCLUDED?
NA
2.9 OUTPUT – RISK BANDING OR LIVE 
RISK/THREAT MANAGEMENT ADVICE?
Not relevant as the IVP is  essentially a screening tool.
2.10 IS PRACTICE GUIDANCE 
PROVIDED?
Online guidance:
http://www.safecampuscommunities.ac.uk/uploads/
editor/files/IVP_Guidance_Draft_v0.3_web_version.
pdf
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3. TRAINING AND LICENSING
3.1 THE CONTENT OF TRAINING
A four-part e-learning package was developed in 2010 
but never utilised. Practitioners use it without receiving 
formal training from the originators. Unknown if 
organisations are training their employees in its use. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that they are.
3.2 OPTIMISED TO WHAT KIND OF 
ASSESSOR(S)?
All public sector employees from primary school 
through to prisons, more recently described as all 
those who have a ‘Prevent duty’ under The Counter-
Terrorism and Security Act 2015.
3.3 LICENSING
Not required.
4. UTILITY & ETHICAL 
PRACTICE
4.1 IS THE FRAMEWORK 
UNDERSTOOD BY STAKEHOLDERS 
AND ACCESSIBLE TO THEM?
Good face validity; high level of interest from UK, 
USA, Canada and renewed interest since the public 
sector Prevent Duty in the UK (Counter-Terrorism & 
Security Act, 2015).
4.2 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS
Not explicit.
5. PUBLICATION HISTORY
5.1 PUBLICATIONS
Cole, J., Cole, B., Alison, E., & Alison, L. (2010). 
Preventing Violent Extremism: Identifying Risk Factors 
in Vulnerable People. Jane's Intelligence Review.
Cole, J., Cole, B., Alison, E., & Alison, A. (2010). Free 
Radicals: Stopping extremists before they start. Jane’s 
Intelligence Review, 22(10), 18-21.
http://www.safecampuscommunities.ac.uk/uploads/
editor/files/IVP_Guidance_Draft_v0.3_web_version.
pdf
5.2 PUBLICATIONS THAT BEAR ON 
INTER-RATER RELIABILITY
Egan, V., Cole, J., Cole, B., Alison, L., Alison, E., 
Waring, S. & Elntib, S. (2016) Can you identify violent 
extremists using a screening checklist and open-source 
intelligence alone? Journal of Threat Assessment and 
Management, 3 (1). pp. 21-36. ISSN 2169-4850. This 
study examined whether the IVP items acted as a useful 
risk screening metric with 182 known violent extremists, 
using publicly available open source intelligence. The 
mean kappa for inter-rater reliability was .80 for the 
30% of cases with the fullest information.
5.3 PUBLICATIONS THAT BEAR ON 
VALIDITY
The above study confirmed the principle that predicting 
the prevalence of a low baseline event (in this case 
terrorist violence) in a low prevalence setting is not 
productive. Like other predictive tools for violence the 
IVP was better at ruling out true negatives than ruling 
in true positives. Missing information, which is the 
real context of pre-crime investigation, also reduced 
predictive utility. The authors conclude that “screening 
instruments must be followed by a ‘human-driven’ risk 
assessment of the individual to optimise judgment of 
the risk…” The total IVP score was a better predictor 
than any individual items.
5.4 FOLLOW UP STUDIES USING THE 
FRAMEWORK
Weyers, J.R. & Cole, J. (2014). Identifying ISIL support 
populations and persons vulnerable to recruitment: 
Implications for force protection. In Cabayan, H. & 
Canna, S. Multi-method assessment of ISIL. Strategic 
Multilayer Assessment Periodic Publication, Special 
Operations Command Central Command (pp156-160)
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6. SUMMARY & EVALUATION
6.1 STRENGTHS
 y Easily accessible on line.
 y Face validity and easy to administer.
 y Provides a means of structuring concerns and 
informing possible referral.
 y No training or licensing required.
 y Empirically grounded and informed by terrorist 
literature.
 y Developed with government stakeholder 
consultation.
6.2 LIMITATIONS 
 y Indicators 1, 4, 10, 11, 15, and 16 are more 
relevant to Islamist extremism, limiting its efficacy 
with other forms of extremism.
 y Developed from features of Al Qaeda inspired 
extremism (political activism, basic paramilitary 
training, travel/residence abroad) that are less 
relevant to ISIS inspired extremism.
 y Atheoretical.
 y No reference to common co-vulnerabilities of 
criminality and mental health issues.
 y As a checklist, no consideration of protective 
factors or risk management.
 y Does not aspire to be a risk management tool, 
rather a means of identifying instances of 
potential Islamist radicalisation in the community. 
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MULTI-LEVEL GUIDELINES (MLG VERSION 2)
1. PROVENANCE
1.1 ORIGINATING AUTHORS, 
PROFESSIONAL AFFILIATION, ROLE 
AND CONTEXT
Alana N. Cook, PhD
Registered Psychologist
Cook Psychological Services
Adjunct Faculty, Simon Fraser University 
Stephen D. Hart, PhD
Professor, Simon Fraser University
Visiting Professor, University of Bergen 
Director and Threat Assessment Specialist, Protect 
International Risk and Safety Services
P. Randall Kropp, PhD 
Registered Psychologist
Forensic Psychologist, British Columbia Forensic 
Psychiatric Services Commission
Adjunct Faculty, Simon Fraser University
Threat Assessment Specialist, Protect International 
Risk and Safety Services
CONTACT EMAIL:
acook@cookpsychservices.com
1.2 BACKGROUND AND 
PROVENANCE
Risk factors were empirically derived from a systematic 
and comprehensive review of the literature (i.e., 
Campbell Collaboration style review). 
1.3 DATE OF FIRST PUBLICATION AND 
SCOPE OF USE. 
The MLG was first produced in 2013 and evaluated 
as part of a doctoral thesis in 2014 (see Cook, 2014 
below). 
It has been in use since then in North America and 
Europe.
1.4 HAS THE FRAMEWORK BEEN 
PEER REVIEWED?
The framework was initially developed and validated 
as part of Dr. Cook’s doctoral dissertation and was 
reviewed by her doctoral dissertation committee in 2014 
that included the co-authors, supervisor Dr. Raymond 
Carrado (criminologist), internal examiner at SFU Dr. 
Garth Davis (criminologist), and external examiner of 
the University of Nebraska-Lincoln Dr. Mario Scalora 
(psychologist).
1.5 AIMS OF THE FRAMEWORK
 y To provide assessors with comprehensive and 
systematic guidelines to assess and communicate 
an individual’s risk for group-based violence, 
including terrorism 
 y To prevent, not predict violence
 y To guide prevention though planning 
 y Ensure assessors are following best-practice 
 y To outline basic risk factors to consider without 
restricting scope or imposing scoring rules 
 y To allow assessors to monitor change in those 
being assessed.
1.6 DESCRIPTION OF APPROACH 
The MLG is an SPJ guide that follows SPJ guidelines: 
gather information, determine the presence and 
relevance of risk factors, develop primary scenarios 
of violence, develop case management plans and 
communicate findings. The model is designed to 
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specify a basic set of empirical and rationally derived 
risk factors that reflect best practice. It is not an actuarial 
tool. There are no scoring rules. 
1.7 TARGET POPULATION 
Pre-crime or post-crime. Individuals (male or female) 
14 years or older who are currently a member of or 
affiliated with a group. Although the MLG assumes 
that all group types can be assessed under these 
guidelines based on logical and empirical evidence, 
future validation of the guidelines will examine if they 
are applicable to all group types. 
Group-based violence (GBV) is defined as the actual, 
attempted, or threated physical injury that is deliberate 
and non-consensual by an individual whose decisions 
and behaviour are influenced by a group to which 
they currently belong or are affiliated with. Affiliation 
can include identification without membership of the 
group (i.e., lone actors). This definition captures all 
major violence groups identified by the World Health 
Organization (WHO, 2002)43 such as gangs, terrorists, 
and organized crime. 
The authors recommend the MLG for use in conjunction 
with other relevant risk assessment tools to evaluate 
terrorist group-based violence if there are relevant 
risk factors not captured in the MLG tool present and 
relevant in the individual case.
1.8 FOCUS OF THE ASSESSMENT
The generic risk of an individual engaging in group-
based violence, including terrorist violence. 
1.9 DIRECT OR INDIRECT 
ASSESSMENT?
Either are possible.
1.10 GENERIC OR SPECIFIC TO 
IDEOLOGY?
Generic to group based violence. 
43 World Report on violence and health (2002). Geneva: World Health Organisation.
1.11 THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS
 y Decision theory 
 y Structured Professional Judgment 
 y Psychology of the Individual
 y Group Dynamics
 y Social Psychology 
2. STRUCTURE
2.1 AN OUTLINE OF THE STRUCTURE
There are 16 basic risk factors, with the opportunity 
for Assessors to consider any additional case-specific 
factors. The 16 basic risk factors cover four domains: 
individual, individual-group, group, and group-societal. 
Individual risk factors are relatively independent 
from that of the individual’s group membership. 
Individual-group factors are how the individual 
relates to the group (e.g., identity, attitudes, the role in 
the group). 
Group factors are related to the group process and 
structure. 
Group-societal factors are external or peripheral 
contributions to violence risk (e.g., intergroup threat). 
2.2 ARE PROTECTIVE FACTORS 
INCLUDED? 
The 20 basic risk factors do not include protective 
factors. Assessors are encouraged to consider and 
include in their formulation and management plans 
case-specific protective factors that are relevant to the 
formulation and prevention of violence in the individual 
case. 
2.3 IS THE FRAMEWORK SENSITIVE 
TO POLITICAL CONTEXT?
Political context, and changes in political context can be 
captured and conceptualized under the group-societal 
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domain (i.e., how the group and following from this the 
individuals risk for violence is impacted by the political 
context). 
2.4 RISK SEEN AS STATIC OR 
DYNAMIC? 
Risk is seen as dynamic. The MLG was developed to be 
appropriate for measuring change in risk and to operate 
as a monitoring tool. 
2.5 TIME-FRAME FOR RISK 
JUDGMENTS 
Time-frame can be weeks to months. The maximum 
recommended period before re-assessment is 12 
months, as risk is dynamic and changing. 
2.6 ANY REFERENCE TO IMMINENCE 
OF HARM? ANY RED FLAGS?
The MLG does not use any red flags. All risk factors 
and any case-specific risk factors that are judged to be 
present and relevant are monitored and managed. One 
of the summary risk judgments to communicate is any 
evidence of imminent risk of harm. 
2.7 INFORMATION REQUIREMENT 
Multimethod multisource information is ideal but 
direct contact with the assesse is not required, though 
is encouraged when it is possible and appropriate. 
Information is required of the individual, the 
individuals’ association with the group, the group 
in question, and the group within the larger societal 
context. A Subject Matter Expert on the group to 
which the person belongs or ascribes to is highly 
recommended and often involved. Information may 
be gathered by direct contact, mental health records, 
corrections records, security information, intelligence, 
and any other relevant interviews or records. 
2.8 IS SCENARIO PLANNING 
INCLUDED?
As an SPJ tool scenario planning is a fundamental part 
of the general procedure to generate primary scenarios 
of violence that are of concern to the assessor. Scenarios 
are then used to develop management plans to prevent 
the scenarios from occurring. 
2.9 OUTPUT – RISK BANDING OR LIVE 
RISK/THREAT MANAGEMENT ADVICE?
Assessors are asked to make several summary risk 
judgments to communicate in their findings (i.e., 
case priority, risk of violence, severity of violence, 
imminence of violence, likely victims) as well as 
development of management plans focused on 
monitoring, surveillance, treatment and victim safety 
planning as appropriate. In addition to group-based 
violence Assessors are also asked to consider any 
indications of other violence risk (general violence, 
sexual violence) or self-harm or suicide that become 
apparent and would trigger another risk assessment. 
2.10 IS PRACTICE GUIDANCE 
PROVIDED?
A guide book takes assessors through the general 
procedure (described above) to form opinions and 
develop plans about violence risk prevention. 
3. TRAINING & LICENSING
3.1 THE CONTENT OF TRAINING
Users will not have to complete a specific training 
program to use the guidelines as training can be 
accomplished in a variety of ways, such as self-study, 
supervised use, or attendance at lectures and workshops. 
Ideally, the assessment is completed in a team with at 
least one team member being a Subject Matter Expert 
on the group to which the person belongs or ascribes 
to. Such an expert could be an analyst, a knowledgeable 
team member with experience and expertise on the 
particular group(s), or an external expert consultant. 
Those interested in workshops can contact Dr. Cook at 
the above email address. 
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3.2 OPTIMISED TO WHAT KIND OF 
ASSESSOR(S)? 
Use by criminal justice, security, and mental health 
professionals working in a variety of contexts where 
there is risk or contact with those involved in group-
base violence.
3.3 LICENSING 
The MLG is copyrighted in Canada by the authors, but 
is an open access tool. It is available for purchase by 
the general public, and evaluators are not required to 
complete a specific training program prior to purchase 
or use of the tool. 
4. UTILITY & ETHICAL 
PRACTICE
4.1 IS THE FRAMEWORK 
UNDERSTOOD BY STAKEHOLDERS 
AND ACCESSIBLE TO THEM?
Stakeholders and users were provided the opportunity 
to provide feedback formally in 2012 and after the first 
publication in 2014 during two training courses (the 
MLG manual provides full details on this process, see 
also Cook, 2014). These professionals represented 
established threat assessment and terrorism experts, 
various level of experienced law enforcement, 
intelligence analysts, and mental health professionals. 
This group also included academics and administrators 
who would not use the tool in practice. The authors 
also routinely solicit feedback from users to improve 
the accessibility of the guidelines in updated versions 
of the manual.
4.2 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
The MLG was developed in line with Canadian 
Psychological Association and American Psychological 
Association ethical principles. 
5. PUBLICATION HISTORY
5.1 PUBLICATIONS THAT BEAR ON 
INTER-RATER RELIABILITY
Cook, A. N., Hart, S. D., & Kropp, P. R. (2013). Multi-
Level Guidelines for the assessment and management 
of group-based violence. Burnaby, Canada: Mental 
Health, Law, & Policy Institute, Simon Fraser 
University.
Intra-class coefficients for averaged ratings were 
0.81 over the four domains. The Hart et al (2017) 
comparative study below confirms coefficients of the 
same order. 
5.2 PUBLICATIONS THAT BEAR ON 
VALIDITY
Cook, A. N. (2014). Risk assessment and management 
of group-based violence (Doctoral Thesis).  
Available from: http://summit.sfu.ca/system/files/
iritems1/14289/etd8437_ACook.pdf
Cook, A. N. & Hart, S.D. (2014). Risk/threat assessment 
and management of group-based violence (including 
terrorism). Internal report for Public Safety Canada.
The first paper provides evidence that the MLG is “face 
valid, content valid, legally valid and evidences clinical 
and practical utility.” However, further evidence is 
awaited for concurrent and predictive validity.
5.3 FOLLOW UP STUDIES USING THE 
FRAMEWORK
Hart, S. D., Cook, A. N., Pressman, D. E., Strang, 
S., & Lim, Y. L. (2017). A concurrent evaluation of 
threat assessment tools for the individual assessment of 
terrorism. Canadian Network for Research on Terrorism, 
Security, and Society Working Paper Series. Available 
from http://tsas.ca/tsas_library_entry/tsas-wp17-01-
a-concurrent-evaluation-of-threat-assessment-tools-
for-the-individual-assessment-of-terrorism/. If the 
link does not take you directly there search under tsas-
wp17-01 on the TSAS site.
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In this study concurrent validity was found between 
the overall summary risk ratings for the MLG and the 
HCR-20, confirming that those identified to be at risk 
for terrorist violence are also identified to be at risk 
within a generic violence framework. This finding does 
not imply that anyone judged to be at risk for general 
violence would also be at risk of terrorist violence. 
Predictably the MLG Individual and Individual-
Group domains overlapped significantly with the 
VERA2 whereas the Group and Group-Society 
domains overlapped very little, confirming that the two 
frameworks are measuring different aspects of group 
based violence.
6. SUMMARY & EVALUATION
6.1 STRENGTHS
 y The MLG was developed from a Campbell 
Collaboration style review that included book 
chapters and theoretical papers due to the shortage 
of empirical papers in the field of group violence. 
 y Empirical grounding was provided by subject 
matter experts in terrorism, gangs, cults and 
organised crime from a social science background 
and form different countries, who reviewed 
the first draft of the guidelines for utility and 
comprehension. Practitioners in threat assessment 
and terrorism, law enforcement, intelligence 
analysts, and mental health professionals 
participated in the first training and live practice 
with the framework. 
 y The framework is informed by Decision theory, 
Psychology of the Individual, Group Dynamics, 
Social Psychology.
 y SPJ structure is fully deployed, from the 
systematic assessment of presence and relevance 
of risk factors through summary risk ratings to 
scenario planning. 
 y Explicitly considers the individual in their social 
and wider societal/political context.
 y Addresses the group affiliation that often 
accompanies identification with a shared group, 
cause or ideology.
 y Has potential use with gangs, terrorists and 
organized criminals.
 y Scenario planning provides a firm foundation for 
risk management. 
 y The Individual-Group and Group-Societal factors 
have demonstrated relevance even with lone actor 
terrorists as their belief system is often defined by 
their opposition to society and perceived social or 
political injustice. 
 y The structure is lean and easily understood by 
users and stakeholders. 
 y Strong inter-rater reliability was established 
during its construction.
6.2 LIMITATIONS 
 y Because of the leanness of the framework users 
need to be experienced risk assessors to evaluate 
the significance of the information.
 y Factors in the Individual domain are general and 
may lack the specificity required for a detailed 
terrorist assessment, which is particularly the case 
for lone actors with idiosyncratic motivation.
 y The Individual domain also lacks sufficient detail 
to assess general violence, which is a feature in 
the backgrounds of many terrorist offenders. For 
this reason the authors recommend that an HCR-
20 is also undertaken for terrorist offenders with 
previous non-terrorist violence. 
 y There is some evidence that the MLG may not 
flag up risk of terrorist pathway offences that fall 
short of terrorist violence, and the additional use 
of the HCR-20 is recommended by the authors. 
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TERRORIST RADICALIZATION ASSESSMENT 
PROTOCOL (TRAP-18)
1. PROVENANCE
1.1 ORIGINATING AUTHORS, 
PROFESSIONAL AFFILIATION, ROLE 
AND CONTEXT
J. Reid Meloy, PhD, ABPP
Forensic Psychologist
Faculty, San Diego Psychoanalytic Center
Clinical Professor of Psychiatry, University of 
California, San Diego
Consultant, FBI Behavioral Analysis Unit, Quantico.
CONTACT EMAIL:
reidmeloy@gmail.com
1.2 BACKGROUND AND 
PROVENANCE
Primarily empirical through study of literature on lone 
actor terrorists over fifteen years, the author’s own 
practice experience, and current research. The TRAP-
18 warning behaviours are derived from the pre-attack 
signals identified in the targeted violence literature 
on lone perpetrators of mass killings, assassinations, 
spousal homicide and terrorist attacks. The distal 
background factors are the theorised features of the 
mind-set of a lone actor ‘violent true believer’ that 
create their vulnerability to targeted violence. 
The TRAP-18 is a proprietary instrument which is 
owned, copyrighted and trademarked in the US by 
Dr. Meloy. The TRAP-18 is licensed to Multihealth 
Systems, Inc., for distribution and sale (mhs.com).
1.3 DATE OF FIRST PUBLICATION OR 
ORIGIN AND SCOPE OF USE. 
As TRAP-18 in Journal of Threat Assessment and 
Management, 2015, 2:140-152; 
Proximal warning behaviours first appeared in 2011 in 
several peer reviewed publications.
Distal characteristics were first published in 2014 (Meloy, 
R., & Yakeley, J. (2014). The violent true believer as a 
lone  wolf– psychoanalytic  perspectives  on  terrorism. 
Behavioural Sciences & the Law, 32(3), 327-365).
TRAP-18 has been in use since 2015 by various 
counterterrorism analysts and investigators in Canada, 
US, and Europe. It is not sanctioned or officially 
adopted by any government or agency.
1.4 HAS THE FRAMEWORK BEEN 
PEER REVIEWED?
See below.
1.5 AIMS OF THE FRAMEWORK
 y To help the threat assessor prioritize cases based 
upon imminence of risk: the presence of a cluster 
of distal characteristics indicates that the case 
should be continuously monitored; the presence 
of any one proximal warning behaviour indicates 
that the case should be more actively managed. 
The term proximal is used in a temporal sense, 
and we use a meteorological analogy (Monahan & 
Steadman, 1996) concerning violence: Watch vs. 
Warn.
 y To identify the pattern within the proximal 
warning behaviours, capitalizing on the findings 
of gestalt psychology (Wertheimer, 1938) that we 
naturally see patterns, allowing the assessor to 
see the larger picture and not just focus upon one 
discrete variable. 
 y To help prioritise cases and assign resources in 
a rational manner (a major unaddressed problem 
throughout the CT community).
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1.6 DESCRIPTION OF APPROACH 
The TRAP-18 is a structured professional judgment 
(SPJ) instrument, not an actuarial measure. Factors 
are coded rather than scored, and the weighting of the 
various indicators is left to the assessor, as well as the 
final assignment of the case to a category of monitoring 
or active management. The focus of the instrument is 
upon prevention rather than prediction. The manual for 
the TRAP-18 contains questions to help the assessor 
develop a narrative for understanding the case given the 
presence or absence of indicators and other idiosyncratic 
circumstances that might apply in the individual case.
1.7 TARGET POPULATION 
Pre-crime: Target population are persons of concern 
(POC) for engagement in ideologically-motivated 
violence who have been identified by counter-terrorism 
and other law enforcement officials.
1.8 FOCUS OF THE ASSESSMENT
Threat of committing an act of ideologically motivated 
and intended (targeted) violence toward a person or 
persons.
The TRAP-18 is primarily focused on the lone actor 
terrorist, and not group actor terrorists, although it has 
been shown to be useful in the analysis of autonomous 
cells in Europe in one study. 
1.9 DIRECT OR INDIRECT 
ASSESSMENT?
A direct interview is very helpful for additional 
information, but in a pre-crime scenario may not be 
possible, necessary or wise.
1.10 GENERIC OR SPECIFIC TO 
IDEOLOGY?
Generic: Commonality across ideologies demonstrated 
empirically in Meloy, J.R. & Gill, P. (2016). The lone 
actor terrorist and the TRAP-18. J of Threat Assessment 
and Management 3: 37-52 in which equivalence was 
shown across 78% of indicators comparing jihadists, 
right wing extremists, and single issue terrorists from 
Europe and the US.
1.11 THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS
The TRAP-18 is informed by:
 y Gestalt psychology
 y Theory and research on targeted violence
 y Psychoanalytic (object relations) theory 
 y Attachment theory
 y Aspects of social psychology
 y Psychobiological foundations of predatory 
violence
(See two foundational papers below by Meloy, 
Hoffmann, Guldimann & James (2012) and Meloy & 
Yakeley (2014)).
2. STRUCTURE
2.1 AN OUTLINE OF THE STRUCTURE
 Two clusters
1. Proximal warning behaviours (8)
2. Distal characteristics (10)
Indicators are coded as present, absent, or insufficient 
information.
2.2 ARE PROTECTIVE FACTORS 
INCLUDED? 
Although protective factors are not formally included, 
the absence of certain indicators, both proximal warning 
behaviours and distal characteristics are protective. The 
narrative questions also explicitly ask about protective 
factors that may be present in the individual case.
2.3 IS THE FRAMEWORK SENSITIVE 
TO POLITICAL CONTEXT?
The TRAP-18 is sensitive to changing political contexts 
and situations in relation to fixation and identification 
among the warning behaviours, and the joining of 
35
TERRORIST RADICAlIzATION ASSESSMENT PROTOCOl (TRAP-18)
TRAINING &LICENSING
personal grievance and moral outrage in the distal 
characteristics.
2.4 RISK SEEN AS STATIC OR 
DYNAMIC? 
All the proximal warning behaviours are dynamic. 
Reassessment is recommended due to the dynamic 
nature of short term risk and the need to prioritise 
cases. 
Several distal characteristics are static (eg, history of 
criminal violence and history of mental disorder).
2.5 TIME-FRAME FOR RISK 
JUDGMENTS 
The time frame is short term (days, weeks, months), 
and most of the indicators are dynamic, meaning they 
can change over time. 
2.6 ANY REFERENCE TO IMMINENCE 
OF HARM? ANY RED FLAGS?
The proximal factors are warning behaviours that 
concern leakage of an intent to offend. The presence 
of any one of these should result in active management 
of the case. 
2.7 INFORMATION REQUIREMENT 
The most reliable and valid assessment of a case 
utilising the TRAP-18 will have three sources of data: 
 y A direct interview (clinical or nonclinical, and 
may or may not utilize psychometric testing}, 
 y Collateral interviews of those who currently know 
the person of concern and his behaviour, and 
 y Public records available on the person, including 
law enforcement and national security sources if 
available.
2.8 IS SCENARIO PLANNING 
INCLUDED?
Scenario planning is an explicit formulation question 
among the narrative questions in the instrument. This 
is based upon the work of Hart and Kropp.
2.9 OUTPUT – RISK BANDING OR LIVE 
RISK/THREAT MANAGEMENT ADVICE?
The TRAP-18 does not band at a level of risk since 
there is no empirical research to support this for any 
instrument (since there are virtually no comparative 
studies). Cases are prioritized for active risk 
management or monitoring so that time and personnel 
efficiencies can be maximized.
The TRAP-18 does not provide explicit risk 
management advice, but the narrative questions 
included in the codebook ask specific questions about 
risk management for the assessor to answer.
2.10 IS PRACTICE GUIDANCE 
PROVIDED?
A codebook guides assessors’ decisions about each 
factor.
3. TRAINING &LICENSING
3.1 THE CONTENT OF TRAINING
Training is provided by Dr. Meloy and his associates 
in several ways: through live training sessions and on 
demand online. The training is 6-7 hours in person 
or online. The method of training is through lecture, 
group discussion, and assessment of actual cases using 
the TRAP-18, examples of cases which illustrate 
each and every indicator, videotapes, and handouts. 
The content of the training involves a conceptual 
overview of the instrument, its origins, research basis, 
and its purpose. The training then moves to a detailed 
description of each indicator with an illustrative case. 
The current reliability and validity research is then 
reviewed, critiqued, and directions for further research 
are outlined. There follows an in depth analysis using 
the TRAP-18 of two individual terrorism cases in the 
36
TERRORIST RADICAlIzATION ASSESSMENT PROTOCOl (TRAP-18)
UTILITY & ETHICAL PRACTICE
US: the Timothy McVeigh case (ethnic nationalist) and 
the Malik Hasan case (jihadist).
3.2 OPTIMISED TO WHAT KIND OF 
ASSESSOR(S)? 
The training is designed for threat assessment 
professionals, including mental health clinicians, 
law enforcement officers, intelligence analysts, 
counterterrorism investigators, and others with specific 
case load or supervisory responsibilities. It is not 
designed for the public. It is specifically tailored to 
maximize learning and use for practical application in 
the field.
User feedback suggests that the TRAP-18 proximal 
factors are very easy to use by those with a basic 
knowledge of psychology, crime/criminology, but that 
more clinical expertise is necessary to interpret the 
distal factors. 
3.3 LICENSING 
The TRAP-18 is copyrighted and trademarked in the 
US by Dr. Meloy, and solely licensed to Multi-health 
Systems, Inc., for worldwide marketing and distribution. 
4. UTILITY & ETHICAL 
PRACTICE
4.1 IS THE FRAMEWORK 
UNDERSTOOD BY STAKEHOLDERS 
AND ACCESSIBLE TO THEM?
Feedback to the developer from stakeholders within 
the national security community in Canada, US, and 
several countries in Europe indicates that it is; the 
TRAP-18 is accessible as outlined above, and through 
scholarly publications.
4.2 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
APA ethical principles have informed the development 
of the TRAP-18; and the instrument, due to its 
generalizability, is free from some forms of bias such 
as targeting of certain ethnic or religious groups. 
The proximal warning behaviours in particular help 
with balancing rights of the individual against the 
state because the focus is upon specific patterns of 
behaviour and not any demographic characteristics 
or profiling. The proximal warning behaviours help 
narrow any investigative efforts to persons of concern 
who are currently engaging in behaviours that warrant 
investigation given the extant research on lone actor 
terrorists and also targeted violence in general.
5. PUBLICATION HISTORY
5.1 FIRST PUBLICATIONS THAT BEAR 
ON INTER-RATER RELIABILITY
In a study independent of the developers, interrater 
reliability demonstrated by Challacombe and Lucas 
(2018) in a comparative study of Sovereign Citizens 
was 0.76 (kappa).
5.2 FIRST PUBLICATIONS THAT BEAR 
ON VALIDITY
Hoffmann, J., Meloy, J.R., Guldimann, A. & Ermer, A. 
(2011). Attacks on German public figures, 1968-2004: 
Warning behaviors, potentially lethal and nonlethal 
acts, psychiatric status, and motivations. Behavioral 
Sciences and the Law, 29, 155-179.
5.3 FOLLOW UP STUDIES USING THE 
FRAMEWORK
Meloy, J.R., & O’Toole, M.E. (2011). The concept of 
leakage in threat assessment. Behavioral Sciences and 
the Law, 29, 513-520.
Hoffmann, J., Meloy, J.R., Guldimann, A. & Ermer, A. 
(2011). Attacks on German public figures, 1968-2004: 
Warning behaviors, potentially lethal and nonlethal 
acts, psychiatric status, and motivations. Behavioral 
Sciences and the Law, 29, 155-179.
Meloy, J.R., Hoffmann, J., Guldimann, A. & James, 
D. (2012). The role of warning behaviors in threat 
assessment: An exploration and suggested typology. 
Behavioral Sciences and the Law, 30, 256-279.
Meloy, J.R. (2011). Approaching and attacking public 
figures: a contemporary analysis of communications 
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and behaviour. In: C. Chauvin, ed., Threatening 
Communications and Behavior: perspectives on 
the pursuit of public figures. Board on Behavioral, 
Cognitive, and Sensory Sciences, Division of Behavioral 
and Social Sciences and Education. Washington, DC: 
The National Academies Press, pp. 75-101.
Meloy, J.R., & Yakeley, J. (2014). The violent true 
believer as a “lone wolf” – psychoanalytic perspectives 
on terrorism. Behavioral Sciences and the Law, 32, 
347-365.
Meloy, J.R., Hoffmann, J., Roshdi, K. & Guldimann, A. 
(2014). Some warning behaviors discriminate between 
school shooters and other students of concern. J of 
Threat Assessment and Management 1: 203-211.
Meloy, J.R. & Hoffmann, J., eds. (2014). International 
Handbook of Threat Assessment. New York: Oxford 
Univ. Press.
Meloy, J.R., Hoffmann, J., Roshdi, K., Glaz-Ocik, 
J. & Guldimann, A. (2014). Warning behaviors 
and their configurations across various domains of 
targeted violence. In: J.R. Meloy & J. Hoffmann (eds.) 
International Handbook of Threat Assessment. New 
York: Oxford Univ. Press.
Meloy, J.R., Habermeyer, E. & Guldimann, A. (2015). 
The warning behaviours of Anders Breivik. J of Threat 
Assessment and Management 2: 164-175.
Bockler, N., Hoffmann, J. & Zick, A. (2015). 
The Frankfurt airport attack: A case study on the 
radicalization of the lone-actor terrorist. J of Threat 
Assessment and Management 2:152-163.
Meloy, J.R., Mohandie, K., Knoll, J. & Hoffmann, 
J. (2015). The concept of identification in threat 
assessment. Behavioral Sciences and the Law, DOI: 
10.1002/bsl.2166.
Meloy, J.R., Roshdi, K., Glaz-Ocik, J. & Hoffmann, J. 
(2015). Investigating the individual terrorist in Europe. 
Journal of Threat Assess Management 2: 140-152.
Meloy, J.R. (April, 2016). Identifying warning 
behaviours of the individual terrorist. FBI Law 
Enforcement Bulletin. Available at leb.fbi.gov.
Meloy, J.R. & Genzman, J. (2016). The clinical threat 
assessment of the lone actor terrorist. Psychiatric 
Clinics of North America, 39, 649-662 http://dx.doi.
org/10.1016/j.psc.2016.07.004.
Meloy, J.R. & Gill, P. (2016). The lone actor terrorist 
and the TRAP-18. J of Threat Assessment and 
Management 3: 37-52.
Meloy, J.R. & Pollard, J. (2017). Lone actor terrorism 
and impulsivity. Journal of Forensic Sciences. V 62, 
Issue 6, pp 1643-1646.
Challacombe, D.J. & Lucas, P.A., (2018) Postdicting 
Violence in Sovereign Citizen Actors. An exploratory 
test of the TRAP-18. Journal of Threat Assessment and 
Management. In press. 
Meloy, J. R., Goodwill, A.M., Meloy, M.J., Amat, G., 
Martinez, M. & Morgan, M (2018).Some TRAP-18 
indicators discriminate between terrorist attackers and 
other subjects of national security concern. Journal of 
Threat Assess Management. In press.
Bockler N, Hoffmann J, Meloy JR.  “Jihad against the 
enemies of Allah:” The Berlin Christmas market attack 
from a threat assessment perspective.  Violence and 
Gender, 2017, DOI: 10.1089/vio.2017.0040
Erlandsson A, Meloy JR.  The Swedish school attack 
in Trollhattan. J Forensic Sciences, 2018, DOI: 
10.1111/1556-4029.13800
Meloy, JR.  The operational development and empirical 
testing of the Terrorist Radicalization Assessment 
Protocol (TRAP-18).  J Personality Assessment, DOI: 
10.1080/00223891.2018.1481077.
Meloy JR.  Threat assessment of lone actor terrorism. 
In: Lone-Actor Terrorism: An Integrated Framework, 
edited by J. Holzer, P. Recupero, P. Gill, A. Dew.  New 
York: Oxford University Press, in press.
Cotti P,  Meloy JR.  The Tamerlan Tsarnaev case: the 
nexus between  psychopathology and ideology in a lone 
actor terrorist.  J Threat Assess Management, in press.
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Goodwill A, Meloy JR.  Visualizing the TRAP-18 
indicators for terrorist attacks with multidimensional 
scaling.  Behavioral Sciences and the Law, in press.
6. SUMMARY & EVALUATION
6.1 STRENGTHS
 y Conforms with SPJ recommended structure.
 y As such it has the potential to contribute to case 
prioritisation pre-crime and information analysis, 
formulation, re-formulation and on-going risk 
management post-crime by application of the 
proximal factors and distal factors separately. 
 y Proximal factors very easy to use by those with a 
basic knowledge of psychology/criminology.
 y Acts as a screening method pre-crime for 
assigning to either active management or 
monitoring.
 y Informed by clinical understanding of the 
psychology of grievance fuelled violence, 
personality disorder, insecure attachment, mental 
health problems and fixated and delusional beliefs.
 y Some distal factors are based on psychoanalytic 
theory providing clinical understanding to inform 
risk assessment and intervention, and potentially 
structure research that is able to build the 
knowledge base. 
 y Studies specifically suggest a relationship 
between the lethality of the violence and the 
degree of psychopathology of the perpetrator, 
underscoring the importance of understanding the 
psychopathology.
 y A growing number of postdictive studies 
are building evidence for the efficacy of the 
framework as an effective retrospective predictor 
of ideologically motivated violence.
 y Supports risk management and prevention, with 
the potential to discriminate between empty 
threats and real threats. 
6.2 LIMITATIONS 
 y The focus on lone actors means that there are no 
references to group influences in the framework, 
potentially limiting its utility with group actors.
 y User feedback is that realistically, in a pre-
crime scenario neither a direct interview, nor 
psychometrics, nor complete information are 
available for a complete TRAP-18 assessment that 
was built initially from a rich source of post-crime 
information. 
 y The psycho-analytic explanation for some of 
the distal factors is hard to validate, and appears 
esoteric to some. Clinical expertise is required to 
make sense of them.
 y There may be a danger from the foundational 
focus on lone actors that group actor extremist 
violence might be over-pathologised with the 
TRAP-18, when the evidence suggests that fewer 
group actors than lone actors have mental health 
problems. 
 y TRAP-18 needs more comparative and postdictive 
research by independent researchers.
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VIOLENT EXTREMISM RISK ASSESSMENT 
VERSION 2 REVISED (VERA-2R)
44  Pressman, D.E. (2009). Risk Assessment Decisions for Violent Political Extremism 2009-02. Public Safety Canada, Government of 
Canada, Ottawa, Cat. No. PS3-1/2009-2-1EPDF; Available: https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/pblctns/2009-02-rdv/2009-02-rdv-eng.pdf
45  Pressman, D.E. & Flockton, J.S. (2012). Calibrating risk of violent political extremists and terrorists: The VERA-2 structured 
assessment. The British Journal of Forensic Practice, 14 (4), 237-251.
1. PROVENANCE
1.1 ORIGINATING AUTHORS, 
PROFESSIONAL AFFILIATION, ROLE 
AND CONTEXT
D. Elaine Pressman, PhD, NIFP & ICCT & Carleton 
University, Ottawa, Canada
Nils Duits, MD, PhD, Netherlands Institute for 
Forensic Psychiatry and Psychology (NIFP) 
Thomas Rinne, MD, PhD, Netherlands Institute for 
Forensic Psychiatry and Psychology (NIFP) 
John S. Flockton, Principal Psychologist, 
Correctional Service of New South Wales (CSNSW)
CONTACT EMAIL:
n.duits@dji.minjus.nl  
for enquiries related to Europe and
e.pressman@rogers.com  
for enquiries related to outside Europe
1.2 BACKGROUND AND 
PROVENANCE
The indicators of the first VERA were based on 
the existing literature of violent extremism. It was 
constructed within the structured professional judgment 
(SPJ) methodology (Pressman, 2009).44 Following 
consultation with terrorism experts, national security 
analysts, law enforcement analysts, and professionals 
trialling it with convicted terrorists in a high security 
prison, revisions were made. This revised version 
was identified as the VERA-2 (Pressman & Flockton, 
2012).45 The current VERA-2R, 2018 version, is an 
updated and improved version of the VERA-2 and the 
VERA-2R 2016. 
The VERA-2R includes three additional motivational 
indicators which have been identified as relevant 
to radicalisation to violence and are applicable to 
men, women and young people. It also includes 11 
additional indicators related to non-violent criminal 
history, personal history and mental disorders. These 
additional evidenced based indicators have been 
identified as potential indicators for violent extremism. 
This version has become more user-friendly; indicators 
have been defined more clearly and consistently, and 
are better explained. Translations are available in 
Dutch, German and French languages in addition to 
the English version.  Finnish and Swedish language 
translations are forthcoming. 
1.3 DATE OF FIRST PUBLICATION OR 
ORIGIN AND SCOPE OF USE. 
The original VERA upon which the VERA-2R is 
based, and which is the updated and improved version, 
was first published in 2009 in Canada (see footnote 1)
The VERA-2R is in use in Europe, North America, 
Australia and South-East Asia in a broad range of 
settings and by various types of experts. About 1200 
professionals have been trained. In Europe about 600 
judicial professionals have been trained (Netherlands, 
France, Belgium, Finland, Sweden, Germany, Austria, 
Denmark, and England) with presentations, manuals 
and training examples in English, Dutch, German, and 
French. The VERA-2R has been implemented in the 
Netherlands since 2015 with 150 professionals trained 
for different judicial settings.
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1.4 HAS THE FRAMEWORK BEEN 
PEER REVIEWED?
The VERA-2R has been continually improved by 
feedback from terrorism experts, national security 
analysts, law enforcement analysts, forensic 
psychiatrists and psychologists, and other professionals 
using the VERA, VERA2, and VERA-2R.  The criteria 
for indicators set out in the VERA-2R have been 
carefully considered and researched. The publications 
in journals and book chapters identifying the VERA 
framework have all been peer-reviewed.
1.5 AIMS OF THE FRAMEWORK
 y The VERA-2R provides a structure for the 
analysis of the individual’s risk of violent 
extremism, based on the person’s:
 y beliefs, attitudes and ideology; social context 
and intention; history, action and capacity, 
and the commitment and motivation of the 
person, 
 y protective and risk-mitigating indicators, and 
 y relevant criminal and personal history and 
potential mental disorders. 
 y The VERA-2R enables the identification of risk 
scenarios with objectives for interventions and 
risk management 
 y The VERA-2R enables violent extremism risk 
monitoring and supervision of persons with risk 
assessments, repeated over time to determine 
changes in risk and protective indicators
1.6 DESCRIPTION OF APPROACH 
The VERA-2R is based on the structured professional 
judgment approach (SPJ). The 34 indicators of the 
VERA-2R domains have their scientific base explained 
and have well described criteria for three levels of 
rating (low, moderate, high). For each indicator extra 
explanation is added with lead questions and extra 
information in bullets. This is also provided for the 11 
additional indicators. 
46  Hart, S.D. & Logan, C. (2011). Formulation of violence risk using evidence based assessments: The Structured Professional Judgment 
approach. In P. Sturmey & M. McMurran (Eds.), Forensic case formulation (pp. 83-106). Chichester, UK: Wiley Blackwell.
47  Douglas,K.S.,Hart,S.D.,Webster,C.D.,&Belfrage,H.(2013). HCR-20: Assessing risk for violence (3rd ed.). Vancouver, BC: Mental 
Health, Law and Policy Institute, Simon Fraser University.
In this way a more objective assessment is possible. 
This objectivity supports consensus discussions in 
cases where more than one professional is involved 
in assessment or management.  The final professional 
judgment of the assessor is based on the weighting of 
all available information and data related to the risk 
and protective indicators. The final judgment is not 
made based on a numerical overall score. Counting the 
indicators to arrive at a sum is not consistent with the 
structured professional judgment methodology of the 
VERA-2R. Different risk scenarios can be considered 
and risk management planning for each of these 
scenarios may be undertaken (Hart & Logan, 2011; 
46Douglas et al., 2013).47
1.7 TARGET POPULATION 
 y The VERA-2R can be used for all types 
of violent extremists, terrorists and violent 
offenders motivated by religious, political or 
social ideologies, pre-crime or post-crime and 
in any judicial setting (prison, forensic mental 
health, prosecution, in court, probation, police, 
intelligence, exit facilities or other). It can 
inform risk assessment, risk management and 
risk decision making including, intervention, to 
track progress or to inform management plans for 
discharge. 
 y The VERA-2R includes six domains, and is 
improved with up to date evidence for each 
indicator. The sixth domain contains 11 additional 
indicators related to criminal history, personal 
history, and mental disorders. 
 y The VERA-2R is appropriate for youths as well as 
for male and female adults. It has been used with 
aspiring and returning foreign terrorist fighters 
and their returning families in addition to the 
other target groups identified above.
1.8 FOCUS OF THE ASSESSMENT
The VERA-2R is aimed specifically at assessing an 
individual’s risk of violent extremism related beliefs, 
attitudes and ideology; social context and intention; 
history, action and capacity, and the commitment 
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and motivation of the person. The focus is also to 
identify any relevant criminal and personal history and 
presenting mental disorders of the individual being 
assessed. It enables risk scenario planning, the charting 
of risk pathways with baseline measures and successive 
measurements repeated over time to determine changes 
in risk and protective indicators. It is applicable both to 
lone actors and to members of extremist groups.
1.9 DIRECT OR INDIRECT 
ASSESSMENT?
Both are possible.
1.10 GENERIC OR SPECIFIC TO 
IDEOLOGY?
The VERA-2R is generic and can be used across the 
spectrum of extremist ideologies. 
1.11 THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS
The 34 indicators and 11 additional indicators of the 
VERA-2R 2018 are based on the literature on violent 
extremism and terrorism related to lone actor terrorism 
(Gill, 2015), violent extremism and terrorist groups, 
suicide terrorism (Lankford, 2014a, 2014b, 2016, 
2018), moral disengagement (Bandura, 1990, 2016). 
Some of the original items were derived from Saucier et 
al (2009),48 Sageman (2004),49 Kruglanski et al (2009). 
50 Other mainstream research related to engagement 
and disengagement and group factors is also included, 
and literature related to mental disorders of lone actors.
2. STRUCTURE
2.1 AN OUTLINE OF THE STRUCTURE
The VERA-2R indicators have a scientific base that is 
explained in the manual with well described criteria for 
three levels of rating (low, moderate, high). For each 
indicator extra explanation is added with lead questions 
and extra information in bullets. This provides a 
48  Saucier, G., Aker, L.G., Shen-Miller, G et al (2009). Patterns of thinking in militant extremism. Perspectives on Psychological Science. 
4(3): 256-271 
49  Sageman, M. (2004) Understanding Terrorist Networks. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press. 
50  Kruglanski, A.W., Chen, X., Dechesne, M., et al (2009). Fully committed: suicide Bombers’ motivation and the quest for personal 
significance. Political Psychology. 30(3): 331-357.
more objective assessment. This objectivity supports 
consensus discussions in cases where more than one 
professional is involved in assessment or management. 
Protective and risk mitigating indicators are scored in 
reverse. A low rating indicates no change, a moderate 
rating indicates some positive shift and a high rating 
indicates a significant change in a positive, protective 
direction and towards risk mitigation. The final 
professional judgment of the assessor is based on the 
weighting of all available information and data related 
to the risk and protective indicators. Summing the 
indicators is not consistent with the SPJ methodology.
The VERA-2R has five domains with 34 indicators and 
three additional domains with 11 indicators.
1. Domain beliefs, attitudes, and ideology (7). This 
domain is of essential importance in identifying 
the nature of the extremism and the support for 
the use of violence to further ideological goals. 
It contains indicators such as grievances and 
perceived injustice, identification of the causes 
or persons responsible for grievances and, moral 
emotions, alienation, the relationship of the 
individual to the laws and norms of the state, and 
in-group affiliation.
2. History, Action and Capacity (6). This domain is 
relevant to an individual’s ability to plan and carry 
out a violent extremist attack. This can include a 
criminal or violent past, specialized training the 
individual has received, access to the necessary 
persons to facilitate a violent extremist action and 
resources and materials. Recent events have shown 
that a dedicated person may only require everyday 
possessions such as a car or a knife to carry out a 
successful violent extremist attack leading to death. 
Nonetheless, specific training with explosives, 
extremist indoctrination and previous criminal 
behaviour remain salient to the identification of 
the skills and capacity a person has available to 
facilitate violent extremist action.
3. Commitment and Motivation (8). This domain 
identifies eight possible individual motivations or 
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indicators that have been identified as drivers of 
violent extremism. Such motivations are important 
for planning intervention programs and for 
understanding the individual’s risk and threat level. 
An individual may be motivated, for example, by 
adventure and excitement, and at the same time 
believe that there is a moral obligation to act, and a 
need to belong to a group. A criminal opportunist 
may have little or no ideological commitment to a 
cause but be driven by financial or other personal 
gain that can result from engagement. Several 
different motivating elements may play a role at 
the same time in pushing an individual to violent 
extremism. 
4. Protective/Risk Mitigating Indicators (6). These 
indicators are important for identifying positive 
changes in persons, both at a specific point in 
time and over a continuum of time. They are 
important for identifying program objectives and 
for measuring the results of intervention programs. 
Disengagement from terrorism might be due to 
psychological or emotional issues and/or physical 
external reasons due to imprisonment, ‘other role’ 
activity, dismissal or withdrawal from the group, a 
change of individual priorities or a moderation in 
ideology or belief.
5. Additional Indicators (11). These indicators in 
three domains (Criminal history, Personal history, 
Mental disorder) may impact the risk of individuals 
engaging in violent extremism and terrorism when 
in combination with the presence of ideological, 
contextual, and motivational indicators identified in 
the VERA-2R. The criminal and personal history 
factors are particularly relevant to youth. These 
indicators are rated as ‘present’ or ‘not present’.
2.2 ARE PROTECTIVE FACTORS 
INCLUDED? 
Six generic protective and risk-mitigating factors are 
identified as protective indicators. 
2.3 IS THE FRAMEWORK SENSITIVE 
TO POLITICAL CONTEXT?
Political views and ideological objectives are considered 
within the Beliefs, Attitudes, and Ideology domain. 
Although there are no specific indicators concerned 
with the geopolitical context of the assessment, such 
information should be documented in the qualitative 
section of each relevant risk indicator.  Such background 
information is considered when the geopolitical context 
is pertinent to the violent extremism and the risk being 
assessed.
2.4 RISK SEEN AS STATIC OR 
DYNAMIC? 
Dynamic. The VERA-2R assessment is based on the 
current status of the individual. Historical indicators are 
interpreted in terms of the impact that past experiences 
have had on the individual’s current presentation, and 
assessments are repeated over time to track change. 
2.5 TIME-FRAME FOR RISK 
JUDGMENTS 
The time-frame of the VERA-2R is short term, 
dependent on the judicial setting. The dynamic nature 
of engagement and/or disengagement necessitates 
repeated measurements. After each assessment advice 
is given when and how a new risk assessment will be 
necessary. After each assessment advice is provided as 
to when and in which context a new risk assessment 
should be undertaken.
2.6 ANY REFERENCE TO IMMINENCE 
OF HARM? ANY RED FLAGS?
This is a judgment made by the assessor. There are no 
red flag indicators as such, but those concerned with 
intention, capability and commitment bear directly on 
risk and threat. 
2.7 INFORMATION REQUIREMENT 
Risk assessment should be based on the most 
complete information possible paying attention to 
credibility, validity, importance, and appropriateness 
of the information. If there is no direct contact with 
the individual the assessment can be based on collateral 
information alone, including surveillance intelligence, 
legal documents and psychological or psychiatric 
evaluations.
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2.8 IS SCENARIO PLANNING 
INCLUDED?
This is not specifically included in the English manual, 
but risk scenario planning is specifically dealt with in the 
VERA-2R training programs and in the training cases. 
Also, the information and formats that accompany 
VERA-2R training programs provide references to risk 
scenario planning and relevance.
2.9 OUTPUT – RISK BANDING OR LIVE 
RISK/THREAT MANAGEMENT? 
Risk banding and a written narrative final judgment in a 
VERA-2R report or risk formulation are recommended. 
This sets out the overall risk assessment (low, moderate 
or high) together with the significant domains and risk 
and protective indicators. These are explained and 
evidenced, and inform risk scenario planning and risk 
management efforts.
2.10 IS PRACTICE GUIDANCE 
PROVIDED?
Yes, the VERA-2R manual or official VERA-2R 
handbook© provides:
1. Explanation of the scientific context of 
radicalisation, violent extremism and terrorism 
and the principles of risk assessment.
2. Development of the VERA-2R.
3. Guidelines for using the VERA-2R.
4. Full explanation of the VERA-2R indicators 
and their evidence base. Reliability and validity 
are discussed. VERA-2R manuals are provided 
to those who complete the specified training 
program.
3. TRAINING & LICENSING
3.1 THE CONTENT OF TRAINING
The VERA-2R training course includes background 
information and the key knowledge base for the tool, 
research findings that underpin the tool, additional 
research needs, definitions related to radicalisation, 
violent extremism and terrorism and practical aspects 
of violent extremism and terrorism related to the law. 
In addition, the knowledge base of group related, and 
lone actor violent extremism and the role of mental 
health problems are included.
The principles of The Structured Professional 
Judgement (SPJ) methodology and risk communication 
are explained. 
Experience with use and implementation are discussed. 
Participants acquire experience in applying the 
indicators and completing assessments with five or 
more actual case studies. 
After completion of the training participants understand 
the VERA-2R rating definitions and are able to apply 
them within the SPJ methodology. They understand the 
benefits and limitations of the VERA-2R in terms of its 
application to violent extremists and are able to explain 
its limitations and advantages. 
A follow-up day every year after completion of 
the training course is advised. This focusses on 
understanding implementation issues and writing 
reports with example formats and a training case. 
Participants leave with more experience of risk 
assessment in daily practice and an understanding of 
how to use appropriate risk concepts and descriptions, 
and how these assessments can be reported.
3.2 OPTIMISED TO WHAT KIND OF 
ASSESSOR(S)? 
Professional staff in key criminal justice and law 
enforcement agencies (psychologists, psychiatrists, 
analysts) and by security and intelligence analysts.
It is preferred if assessor(s) have experience in 
undertaking individual assessments and hold a position 
in a government agency, security service, international 
agency or are professionally authorised to conduct risk 
assessments.
3.3 LICENSING 
The VERA-2R has a copyright and a trademark for 
European countries (NIFP, Dutch Custodial Services, 
Nils Duits) and for countries outside Europe (D. Elaine 
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Pressman). Professionals have to follow a specific 
VERA-2R training course to obtain the manual 
or official VERA-2R handbook©. They receive a 
certificate and have access to the extranet environment 
of the VERA- 2R website.
4. UTILITY & ETHICAL 
PRACTICE
4.1 IS THE FRAMEWORK 
UNDERSTOOD BY STAKEHOLDERS 
AND ACCESSIBLE TO THEM?
The framework has face, content and construct validity 
as all risk indicators and risk domains are directly 
related to violent extremism.
A half-day introductory course  is available for 
professionals who are stakeholders in extremism risk-
assessments, such as lawyers, public prosecutors and 
judges, and for senior officials and executives from 
prison and probation services.
A one-day introductory and interactive course on 
the VERA-2R is available for frontline workers and 
professionals who work with violent extremists, such 
as police officers, teachers, psychologists, psychiatrists, 
social workers in mental health and prison settings, and 
municipal social workers.
4.2 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
The focus of the VERA-2R is on violent extremism, 
and it cannot be used for other purposes. Users must 
be familiar with the research, SPJ methodology, have 
operational knowledge of violent extremism and use the 
latest version of the protocol. The VERA-2R can only 
be used within the specifications and limits described 
in the training. Users must be able to explain to others 
what the limitations and advantages of the VERA-
2R and SPJ approach are in its application to violent 
extremists, and be able to write reports explaining and 
communicating this. For example, the VERA-2R is 
not a screening instrument that can be applied to the 
general population. 
51 Beardsley, N. L. & Beech, A.R. (2013). Applying the violent extremist risk assessment (VERA) to a sample of terrorist case studies. Journal 
of Aggression, Conflict and Peace Research, 5 (1) 4- 15.
Written informed consent of the subject may be 
required, depending on the assessment situation. 
5. PUBLICATION HISTORY
5.1 PUBLICATIONS THAT BEAR ON 
INTER-RATER RELIABILITY
Kappa values for inter-rater agreement within the 
Beardsley and Beech (2013)51 study between two 
independent raters across five terrorist case studies 
were all >0.76.
5.2 PUBLICATIONS THAT BEAR ON 
VALIDITY
Pressman, D. E., & Flockton, J. (2014). Violent 
extremist risk assessment: Issues and applications of 
the VERA 2 to the high security prison setting. In A. 
Silke (Ed New York: Routledge. This chapter reports 
a study about construct validity in which there were 
statistically significant differences between terrorists 
and non-terrorist violent offenders on a range of 
risk tools (VERA-2, LSI-R; the HCR-20, Version 2, 
Psychopathy Checklist; Screening Version, and the 
Violence Risk Scale; Screening Version). The terrorist 
offenders were significantly lower risk than the non-
terrorist violence offenders in terms of general violence 
and criminality, but significantly higher risk for violent 
extremism as assessed by the VERA 2.
The authors explain its face validity and user-
friendliness, deductive validity (the framework 
measures the elements of the offending that lead to 
the conviction), construct validity, and content validity 
(degree to which the indicators reflect the characteristics 
of violent extremists). With this being the case it would 
be expected that extremist offenders would score higher 
on the VERA-2R than non-terrorist offenders. 
Beardsley N.L. & Beech A. R. (2013), see footnote 
51. Applying the violent extremist risk assessment 
(VERA) to a sample of terrorist case studies. This 
study compared the scores of a group of general 
violence perpetrators with five foreign terrorists on five 
assessment tools for general violence, and the VERA. 
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The VERA performed better in returning higher scores 
for the terrorists than for the general violent group, 
and the general violence assessments returned higher 
scores for the generally violent perpetrators than the 
terrorists (p=<.01).
5.3 FOLLOW UP STUDIES USING THE 
FRAMEWORK
Herzog-Evans, M. (2018). A comparison of two 
structured professional judgment tools for violent 
extremism and their relevance in the French context. 
European Journal of Probation 2018, Vol. 10(1) 3 –27. 
This descriptive study compared the VERA-2 and 
the ERG22+ for the French probation context with 
convicted terrorists. The author found overlap in content 
and intrinsic value between the two frameworks, the 
main difference being the previous VERA’s emphasis 
on ideology as a motivating factor in contrast to the 
ERG’s emphasis on identity issues as drivers for 
extremism. The author concluded that both tools have 
strengths, but that the ERG was more suitable for the 
assessment of individuals in France where, like the 
UK, terrorist offenders have not necessarily carried out 
an act of extremist violence.
The French Ministry of Justice (Direction 
Administration Penitentiaire; DAP) reviewed risk 
assessment approaches and chose to implement the 
VERA-2R in the French prison services. VERA-
2R training courses were provided in France to the 
French National Prison Administration and Training 
Institution (ENAP).
A European Database of convicted (and deceased) 
terrorists and their actions has been developed 
based on judicial documents. The research group is 
compared with a control group of ‘ordinary’ convicted 
violent offenders. The aim of the European Database 
is to map factors that are related to engagement, 
continuation and disengagement in terrorist activities. 
The European Database contains more than 300 
indicators about terrorists, motives, risk indicators and 
VERA-2R indicators, and psychopathology in relation 
to contextual characteristics, and judicial interventions. 
The European Database will be filled at the start of 
2019. This project is financed by the European Union 
and has six participating European Member States 
(Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Sweden, The 
Netherlands).
6. SUMMARY & EVALUATION
6.1 STRENGTHS
 y Conforms with the SPJ approach
 y Has become more empirically informed in its later 
revisions as the knowledge base has grown  
 y Is applicable to all ideological types 
 y The focus on violent extremism gives the VERA-
2R strong face, content, and construct validity 
 y Allows the addition of specific indicators relevant 
to the individual being assessed
 y Provides a rich source of detail for risk 
assessment and risk management where sufficient 
information is available to address each indicator
 y The criteria are well described criteria and the 
requirement for detailed information supports 
objective assessment and consensus discussions 
where more than one professional is involved in 
the task.   
 y Includes some protective/ risk-mitigating 
indicators 
 y Good inter-rater reliability has been demonstrated 
in one small study 
 y Validity may potentially be tested within the 
European DARE Database study
6.2 LIMITATIONS 
 y Not designed to assess terrorist pathway offences 
that do not include violent action or the support of 
violent action.
 y Items are comprehensive and added to as new 
indicators come to light. Users say that there is 
a danger that allowing it to grow results in some 
loss of clarity 
 y Each item requires both quantitative rating and 
qualitative information from as many sources 
as possible, documented in detail. The time 
requirement may represent a challenge in some 
contexts. 
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 y The risk level for each of the items is defined 
either qualitatively or quantitatively, though 
users have questioned the empirical basis for 
these definitions and suggest that a professional 
judgment of low, medium or high is all that is 
required 
 y Needs access to classified information that 
may not be available to clinical or correctional 
practitioners
 y Protective indicators are general risk mitigating 
and/or disengagement indicators, that do not 
substitute for individually relevant protective 
influences 
 y The authors’ claims for content validity (the 
indicators reflect the characteristics of violent 
extremists) and deductive validity (the framework 
measures the elements of the offending that 
lead to the conviction) need evidencing through 
empirical studies.
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